The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
There were
“no indications to suggest that Iraq had produced more than a
few
grams of
weapons-usable nuclear material”, and all of that had been
removed
from Iraq.
•
There were
“no indications” that Iraq had acquired other
weapons-usable
nuclear
material.
•
All the
“safeguarded research reactor fuel, including the HEU fuel that
Iraq had
planned to
divert to its ‘crash programme’, was verified and fully accounted
for
by the IAEA
and removed from Iraq”.
•
There were
“no indications” that “any physical capability for the production
of
amounts of
weapons-usable nuclear material of any practical
significance”.
344.
Dr Blix stated
that there were “no indications of significant discrepancies” in
Iraq’s
latest
declaration.
345.
The report
stated that a letter of 1 May from Iraq’s Minister of Foreign
Affairs
reflected
“Iraq’s unconditional reaffirmation of its obligations under the
NPT” and “its
acceptance
of its obligations, as interpreted by the IAEA, under Iraq’s
Safeguards
Agreement
with the Agency”.
346.
The report
observed that:
“… taking
into account the possibility, albeit remote, of undetected
duplicate facilities
or the
existence of anomalous activities or facilities outside this
technically coherent
picture, no
absolute assurances can be given with regard to the completeness
of
Iraq’s
FFCD. Some uncertainty is inevitable in any country-wide technical
verification
process
which aims to prove the absence of readily concealable objects or
activities.
The extent
to which such uncertainty is acceptable is a policy
judgement.”
347.
The report
said that the IAEA’s:
“…
activities regarding the investigation of Iraq’s clandestine
nuclear programme
have
reached a point of diminishing returns … The IAEA is not ‘closing
the books’ on
its
investigation … and will continue to exercise its right to
investigate any aspect of
Iraq’s
clandestine nuclear programme, in particular, through the follow-up
of any new
information
…”
348.
In his memoir,
Dr Blix wrote:
“There was
general agreement … that there were no significant
‘disarmament’
matters to
clear up in the nuclear dossier, only some ‘questions’ to
clarify.”142
349.
The Security
Council considered the report from Mr Butler and a draft
resolution
on
23 October.143
Dr Blix’s
report was not formally tabled for discussion in the
Security
Council.
142
Blix
H. Disarming
Iraq.
Bloomsbury, 2004.
143
UN Security
Council, ‘3826th Meeting Thursday 23 October 1997’
(S/PV.3826).
86