The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
In its
Reports to Congress, the US DoD monitored ethno‑sectarian diversity
in the
IMOD.1003
On 26 May
2006, it stated that the leadership of the IMOD, selected
with
MNSTC‑I
co‑ordination, was majority Sunni.
On 29
August, Sunnis and Kurds were over‑represented, in relation to the
population,
at higher
command levels, though Shia commanders held the majority of
command
positions.1004
That was
reported to reflect the requirement for military experience,
which
Sunnis had
obtained in the Iraqi Army before the invasion and Kurds had
obtained through
years of
experience in the Peshmerga.
The
composition of Iraqi Army divisions could be divided into two
groups. The nationally
recruited
divisions (those with an odd number) were roughly representative of
the
country.1005
The even
numbered divisions, which had been recruited locally, initially
as
ICDC
personnel then ING, were more homogenous.
Describing
the composition of Iraqi Army divisions, the JIC recorded that “of
the 10 Army
divisions,
three are heavily Shia (over 90 percent), a further three are
Shia‑dominated, two
are mostly
Kurdish and one is relatively mixed, which is unsurprising given
that five are
based on
National Guard divisions recruited locally in 2003. Among the top
three senior
Army
officer grades, representation broadly reflects the national
confessional breakdown:
Sunnis 20
percent; Shia about 50‑60 percent; the Kurds 20‑30
percent.”1006
To increase
diversity in the odd numbered divisions, the intent was for
replacements from
a national
recruiting pool to join these units.1007
Further
army recruitment was done at the
national
level with IMOD policy strictly prohibiting unit commanders from
hiring their own
personnel
and clearly requiring enlisted and commissioned personnel to attend
national
training
schools to receive certification of their rank and duty
speciality.1008
1086.
On 3 November,
the British Embassy Baghdad reported that a video
conference
between
President Bush and Prime Minister Maliki had resulted in agreement
to
accelerate
the pace of training the ISF, their assuming command and control
and the
transfer of
security responsibility to the Iraqi Government.1009
1087.
A High Level
Working Group with three sub‑committees was established
to
report on
whether and how acceleration could take place in each area. The
Working
Group
consisted of Gen Casey and Ambassador Khalilzad, along with
the Iraqi National
Security
Adviser, Minister of the Interior and Minister of
Defence.
1003
Report to
Congress, 26 May 2006, Measuring
Stability and Security in Iraq.
1004
Report to
Congress, 29 August 2006, Measuring
Stability and Security in Iraq.
1005
Report to
Congress, 26 May 2006, Measuring
Stability and Security in Iraq.
1006
JIC
Assessment, 9 June 2006, ‘The Iraqi Security Forces: Fit For
Duty?’.
1007
Report to
Congress, 29 August 2006, Measuring
Stability and Security in Iraq.
1008
Report to
Congress, 17 February 2006, Measuring
Stability and Security in Iraq.
1009
eGram
48788/06 Baghdad to FCO London, 3 November 2006, ‘Accelerating
Security Transition’.
306