The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

FCO Permanent Under Secretary), Ms Eliza Manningham-Buller (Director General of

the Security Service) and Dr David Pepper (Director, GCHQ), as well as to Mr Blair,

there was no mention of any doubts about the reliability of any of the intelligence on

Iraq’s WMD.

545. Following the evidence to the Hutton Inquiry of Dr Brian Jones (the branch head of

the nuclear, biological and chemical section in the Scientific and Technical Directorate

of the Defence Intelligence Staff, 1987 to January 2003), Sir Richard Dearlove’s Private

Secretary asked for Mr Straw’s permission for Sir Richard to disclose the reports of

11 and 23 September 2002 to the ISC on 8 September 2003.203

546. The letter stated that Sir Richard Dearlove had told the Committee, during

a hearing on 17 July, that the “reporting came from a new source on trial and was

subsequently withdrawn”.

547. Mr Straw approved the request the following day.204

548. In its Report published in September 2003, the ISC stated that it had considered

the concerns expressed by two individuals in the DIS about “the language used in

the draft dossier, which was not in their view supported by the intelligence available

to them on the current production of chemical and biological agents and weapons”.

The Report stated:

“We were told that there was further intelligence of a nature so sensitive that it

was only released on a very restricted basis. We have seen the intelligence and

understand the basis on which the CDI [Chief of Defence Intelligence] and JIC took

the view they did.”205

549. The ISC Report did not state that the intelligence had been withdrawn.

550. The Butler Report noted that the reporting had been withdrawn in July 2003.

551. The Butler Report, published on 14 July 2004, stated that SIS had withdrawn the

two reports (of 11 and 23 September 2002) in July 2003, “because the sourcing chain

had by then been discredited”.206 SIS had interviewed the alleged sub-source after the

conflict who had “denied ever having produced the information in the reports”.

203 Letter PS/C to Adams, 8 September 2003, ‘Additional ISC Request for Access to Intelligence’.

204 Letter Straw to C, 9 September 2003, [untitled].

205 Intelligence and Security Committee, Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction – Intelligence and

Assessments, September 2003, Cm5972, paragraph 101.

206 Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,

paragraph 405.

386