6.5 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, January to
March 2003
was not
possible to answer Mr Blair’s questions definitively. Reducing
troop numbers by
the autumn
and devising an exit strategy depended on a number of
factors:
•
the outcome
of the military campaign;
•
the
attitudes of the US and the Iraqi people;
•
negotiation
of an authorising resolution;
•
the ability
to build a broader Coalition; and
•
success in
achieving Coalition objectives for Iraq.
“There is
therefore a substantial risk that if we fail to obtain a UNSCR, we
will not be
able to
build the Coalition under overall US leadership. We would become
trapped
into
maintaining a higher level of commitment for longer, with all that
this would
mean in
terms of cost and for the long-term health of the Armed
Forces.”
1242.
On the size of
the UK sector, the FCO expanded on the advice in the
Straw/Hoon
joint
minute:
“… we need
to determine in the first instance the nature of the military task,
and
make an
assessment of the UK and other Coalition resources likely to be
available.
Only then
can we answer the question about geographical coverage. If the task
is
to promote
a secure environment, the size of the area will depend on the
number of
troops that
are available and the attitude of the Iraqis. The expectation is
that Basra,
and the
area around it, linked to existing administrative boundaries,
should be the
focus.
Plans need to remain flexible until we are able to define the task
and confirm
the
attitude of the population. US thinking appears to have moved away
from too
early
definition of ‘sectors’ for exactly the reasons explained
above.”
1243.
The Inquiry
has seen no response from No.10.
1244.
The Cabinet
Office sent draft UK post-conflict objectives to senior
officials
in the FCO,
the MOD and DFID on 25 March.
1245.
The draft
objectives were to be shown to Ministers before being
submitted
for formal
approval.
1246.
The
objectives restated a familiar list of broad UK aspirations for the
future
of Iraq
that had been under discussion since late 2002.
1247.
There is no
indication whether the objectives were ever adopted
formally.
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