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6.5  |  Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, January to March 2003
was not possible to answer Mr Blair’s questions definitively. Reducing troop numbers by
the autumn and devising an exit strategy depended on a number of factors:
the outcome of the military campaign;
the attitudes of the US and the Iraqi people;
negotiation of an authorising resolution;
the ability to build a broader Coalition; and
success in achieving Coalition objectives for Iraq.
1241.  The FCO warned:
“There is therefore a substantial risk that if we fail to obtain a UNSCR, we will not be
able to build the Coalition under overall US leadership. We would become trapped
into maintaining a higher level of commitment for longer, with all that this would
mean in terms of cost and for the long-term health of the Armed Forces.”
1242.  On the size of the UK sector, the FCO expanded on the advice in the Straw/Hoon
joint minute:
“… we need to determine in the first instance the nature of the military task, and
make an assessment of the UK and other Coalition resources likely to be available.
Only then can we answer the question about geographical coverage. If the task is
to promote a secure environment, the size of the area will depend on the number of
troops that are available and the attitude of the Iraqis. The expectation is that Basra,
and the area around it, linked to existing administrative boundaries, should be the
focus. Plans need to remain flexible until we are able to define the task and confirm
the attitude of the population. US thinking appears to have moved away from too
early definition of ‘sectors’ for exactly the reasons explained above.”
1243.  The Inquiry has seen no response from No.10.
1244.  The Cabinet Office sent draft UK post-conflict objectives to senior officials
in the FCO, the MOD and DFID on 25 March.
1245.  The draft objectives were to be shown to Ministers before being submitted
for formal approval.
1246.  The objectives restated a familiar list of broad UK aspirations for the future
of Iraq that had been under discussion since late 2002.
1247.  There is no indication whether the objectives were ever adopted formally.
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