The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
insurgency
operations, including during implementation of the state of
emergency
in Basra.
But there have been recent instances of a breakdown of discipline.
It
failed to
prevent the looting of MNF camps when they were handed over in
Amarah
and
Samawah. And on 24 August over 100 men from the battalion based
in
Amarah
refused an order to deploy to Baghdad. Intelligence shows that some
army
personnel
retain loyalties to JAM and Badr militias. We do not know the scale
of this
problem,
and we judge that it is less severe than in the police. But the
loyalty of the
army in the
South has not been seriously tested.”1156
1240.
On 31 August,
Maj Gen Shirreff wrote that members of 10th Division had
refused
orders to
deploy to Baghdad.1157
He viewed
that event and the looting of MNF camps
described
by the JIC as indicating “that the IA is built on shakier
foundations than we
might wish
and is a real concern”.
1241.
Operation
SALAMANCA was a plan conceived in the summer of 2006 to
address
the
security situation in the South and move Basra towards PIC. It is
described in detail
in Section
9.5.
1242.
Lieutenant
General Sir Richard Shirreff explained to the Inquiry
that the Basra
Security
Plan announced by Prime Minister Maliki had “amounted really to
nothing
more than
the establishment of a Basra security committee” and
Op SALAMANCA was
therefore
“the operationalising of the Iraqi Basra security
plan”.1158
He told the
Inquiry
that its
concept was:
“… to
achieve security, to excise the death squads, to defeat JAM,
through the
synchronised
application of what we call kinetic, ie force, and non‑kinetic,
ie
reconstruction
and development.”
1243.
In his weekly
report on 31 August, Maj Gen Shirreff said that he aimed
to prepare
10th
Division for operations in Basra during
Op SALAMANCA.1159
He remarked
that that
could
provide “potentially more of an Iraqi face on
Op SALAMANCA”.
1244.
On 1
September, Mr Browne’s Private Secretary wrote to
Mr Blair’s Private
Secretary
that Mr Browne had approved the additional troops requested
for
Op SALAMANCA
because he had “judged that the likely impact of a short
term
extension
of an increased troop presence is offset by the need for momentum
for the
projects
that will make a visible impact in the city”.1160
1156
JIC
Assessment, 27 September 2006, ‘Iraq: The Security Situation in the
South’.
1157
Minute
Shirreff, 31 August 2006, ‘GOC MND(SE) – Southern Iraq Update – 31
August 2006’.
1158
Public
hearing, 11 January 2010, pages 14‑19.
1159
Minute
Shirreff, 31 August 2006, ‘GOC MND(SE) – Southern Iraq Update – 31
August’.
1160
Letter
Beadle to Banner, 1 September 2006, ‘Iraq: troop levels in support
of Op.SALAMANCA’.
344