12.2 |
Conclusions: Security Sector Reform
13.
Even though
officials had warned that knowledge of conditions within Iraq
was
incomplete,
it was assumed that Iraq would have a functioning criminal justice
system
and
security forces which, after the removal of Ba’athist leadership,
would have the
capacity to
play their part in its reconstruction.
14.
It was unclear
how the international SSR effort would be co‑ordinated and
therefore
what
contribution the UK would make.
15.
Immediately
after the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime there was widespread
looting
by the
Iraqi population, including in Baghdad and Basra. As described in
Section 9.8,
UK forces
in Basra were not given instructions by their commanders in the UK
on how to
deal with
it.
16.
Brigadier
Graham Binns, commanding the 7 Armoured Brigade which had
taken
Basra City,
concluded that “the best way to stop looting was just to get to a
point where
there was
nothing left to loot”.7
17.
As the need
for a functioning police force to control lawless behaviour
became
increasingly
apparent, there remained no strategy for SSR.
18.
Officials from
the Department for International Development (DFID) reported that
the
Office of
Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) had drawn up
extensive
plans for
SSR but that those had been disregarded by the US and Coalition
military.
19.
The UK
recognised that an SSR strategy was needed. On 24 April, the
AHMGIR
agreed that
the UK should lobby the US to create a “comprehensive strategy”,
and to
involve UK
personnel in ORHA scoping studies.
20.
A paper
produced for the AHMGIR on 8 May indicated that the UK’s
approach
continued
to be based on the assumption that “the UK will neither be required
nor able
to develop
an independent policy on SSR in Iraq”.8
The UK’s
immediate priorities were
therefore
to influence the development of US policy, recognising
that:
“Reform
across the full range of security activities (armed forces,
intelligence
agencies,
justice and law enforcement institutions) is an essential element
of the
overall
Coalition strategy to establish a united and representative Iraqi
Government
and to
create the conditions under which the Coalition can eventually
disengage.”
7
Private
hearing, 2 June 2010, page 11.
8
Paper IPU,
May 2003, ‘Iraq – Security Sector Reform’.
417