3.3 |
Development of UK strategy and options,
April to July 2002
1.
This Section
addresses the development of UK policy on Iraq following Mr
Blair’s
meeting
with President Bush at Crawford on 5 and 6 April 2002, at which Mr
Blair
proposed a
partnership between the US and UK urgently to deal with the threat
posed
by Saddam
Hussein’s regime, including Mr Blair’s Note to President Bush at
the end of
July
proposing that the US and UK should use the UN to build a coalition
for action.
2.
This Section
does not address:
•
the
development of a dossier setting out the publishable evidence on
Iraq’s
weapons of
mass destruction (WMD), the history of weapons inspections
and
Iraq’s
human rights abuses, which is addressed in Section 4.1;
or
•
MOD work on
possible options for a UK contribution to a future
military
operation,
which is addressed in Section 6.1.
3.
The roles and
responsibilities of key individuals and bodies are described
in
Section 2.
•
By July 2002,
the UK Government had concluded that President Bush was
impatient
to move on
Iraq and that the US might take military action in circumstances
that
would be
difficult for the UK.
•
Mr Blair’s
Note to President Bush of 28 July sought to persuade President Bush
to
use the UN
to build a coalition for action by seeking a partnership with the
US and
setting out
a framework for action.
•
Mr Blair told
President Bush that the UN was the simplest way to encapsulate
a
“casus
belli” in some defining way, with an ultimatum to Iraq once
military forces
started to
build up in October. That might be backed by a UN
resolution.
•
Mr Blair’s
Note, which had not been discussed or agreed with his
colleagues,
set the UK
on a path leading to diplomatic activity in the UN and the
possibility of
participation
in military action in a way that would make it very difficult for
the UK
subsequently
to withdraw its support for the US.
4.
After Mr
Blair’s meeting with President Bush at Crawford, the MOD
began
seriously
to consider what UK military contribution might be made to
any
US‑led military
action and the need for a plausible military plan for the
overthrow
of Saddam
Hussein’s regime.
5.
In his letter
to Mr Blair of 22 March 2002 (see Section 3.2), Mr Geoff Hoon,
the
Defence
Secretary, had cautioned that, “before any decision to commit
British forces,
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