The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
462.
Papers for the
final DOP(I) meeting of 2005, on 20 December, included
a
post‑election
work plan by the IPU, an update on progress with Iraqiisation and a
note
on the
handover of security responsibility.265
463.
The IPU work
plan described the UK’s immediate objectives post election
as:
“•
A short and
well-managed interregnum between Transitional Government
and
the next
Government, leading to;
•
Rapid
formation of a competent and representative Government, legitimate
in
the eyes of
all Iraq’s communities, followed by;
•
A limited
number of key decisions (which serve the Iraqi people and
partnership
between
Iraq and the Coalition) taken quickly and visibly, in parallel
with;
•
Increasing
Sunni Arab political participation and;
•
Smooth
progress in the South-East towards transition
•
Visible
international commitment, in context of 2006 partnership with
Iraq.” 266
464.
The IPU hoped
that it might be possible for an Iraqi government to be formed
by
the end of
January, six weeks after the election.
465.
Negotiations
to form a new government continued into spring 2006. Section
9.4
describes
UK efforts to encourage the formation of a broad and inclusive
government of
national
unity.
466.
One month
after the DOP(I) decision to adopt a 4-2-1 model for PRTs in the
South,
the UK
adopted a new model which focused on Basra and Dhi Qar
only.
467.
Air Chief
Marshal Glenn Torpy, the Chief of Joint Operations, advised
Lt Gen Fry
on 21
December that the 4-2-1 model appeared to satisfy the
US.267
The UK
now
needed to
press ahead quickly to keep the initiative. First indications were
that neither
the FCO nor
DFID could find additional financial resources; the MOD would have
to
“bridge the
gap”. Initial funding requirements might be “modest” and could be
generated
by making
savings elsewhere in MND(SE). The MOD would also need to push the
other
departments
to deploy the staff necessary to get the PRTs off the ground
quickly.
468.
The 29
December IPU update for DOP(I) members stated that, faced with
logistical
and
financial difficulties, US enthusiasm for the PRT model was waning
and their roll-out
timetable
was slipping.268
US
officials were “increasingly flexible” about UK plans for
the
PRT
structure in the South and would “not look too closely at
implementation (especially
in Maysan
and Muthanna)”. That provided the UK with an opportunity to
establish the
265
Paper
Cabinet Office, 19 December 2005, ‘DOP(I) Meeting:
Agenda’.
266
Paper IPU,
16 December 2005, ‘Iraq: Post-Election: UK Work Plan’.
267
Minute CJO
to DCDS(C), 21 December 2005, ‘Key Operational Issues for Early
2006’.
268
Letter
Siddiq to Quarrey, 29 December 2005, ‘Iraq: Update as at 29
December’ attaching Paper IPU,
29 December
2005, ‘Iraq: Update as at 29 December’.
274