The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

inception phase … We have an excellent team here. And the Consulate [the British

Embassy Office] will be a fine building when completed.”

331.  Mr Collis told the Inquiry:

“Security was the most important factor, and by several orders of magnitude more

significant than any other single constraint, because it made it much more difficult

to tackle any of the other constraints.” 227

332.  On 5 August, Mr Collis reported that the detention on 3 August of four members of

the Office of the Martyr Sadr (OMS) militia had increased tension between the Sadrist

militia and the MNF in Basra City, Maysan and Nasiriyah.228

333.  The tension was such that Mr Collis considered there was “a fair probability of

mortar attack attempts on British bases tonight, possibly including our Consulate”.

334.  The British Embassy Office was locked down in mid‑August.229 Mr Collis reported

that, with the help of the military, staff were able to fly out on recuperation breaks using

spare seats on helicopters visiting the military compound in Basra. They then transferred

to military flights from Basra Airport to Kuwait. Staff were not yet using that route to

return to the compound.

335.  The British Embassy Office Basra was locked down at least three times in the

second half of September, including:

• after further OMS attacks on 17 and 18 September;230

• after an attack on the Basra Palace site on 22 September;231 and

• after attacks on international civilian vehicles in Basra on 28 September.232

336.  On 29 September, there were three rocket attacks on the Basra Palace site,

including a direct hit on the British Embassy Office.233

337.  On 21 September, Mr Dickie Stagg, FCO Director General Corporate Affairs,

reported on a short visit to Baghdad and Basra.234 He informed senior FCO officials,

including Sir Michael Jay and Mr Sawers, that he had been impressed by the “resilience

227  Private hearing, 22 June 2010, page 48.

228  Telegram 86 Basra to FCO London, 5 August 2004, ‘Iraq: OMS activity in Basra’.

229  Telegram 104 Basra to FCO London, 12 August 2004, ‘Southern Iraq: Sitrep’.

230  Telegram 151 Basra to FCO London, 18 September 2004, ‘Iraq: Clashes in Basra’.

231  Telegram 154 Basra to FCO London, 23 September 2004, ‘Iraq: Basra Security Situation’.

232  Telegram 156 Basra to FCO London, 28 September 2004, ‘Iraq: Attacks on International Civilian

Vehicles in Basra’.

233  Telegram U/N [un‑numbered] Basra to FCO London, 29 September 2004, ‘Attack on British Consulate

Basra’.

234  Minute Stagg to Jack, 21 September 2004, ‘Iraq: Security/Morale/Staffing’.

302