The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

754.  It was not clear to the FCO whether Mr Brahimi’s team would recommend what

form the caretaker government should take. One option was that sovereignty would be

transferred to the Governing Council. This:

“… may not be enough to mark a clear change from the Occupation and give

sufficient domestic legitimacy.”

755.  Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani was understood to have accepted Mr Brahimi’s

recommendations.

756.  Sir Hilary Synnott and Mr Blair met in London on 17 February.412 The purpose

of the meeting was for Mr Blair to thank Sir Hilary for his efforts in Basra. The main

point made by Sir Hilary during the discussion was that transition to Iraqi sovereignty

could lead to a loss of momentum in reconstruction in the South after the dismantling

of CPA(South). Mr Blair agreed that it needed to be maintained.

757.  On 20 February, Sir Nigel Sheinwald, Mr Sawers and Sir David Manning met

Dr Rice at the White House. Sir Nigel set out the UK’s view that the Iraqi political

structure post-handover should comprise:

“… a three to nine member Presidency; a technocratic Council of Ministers, headed

by a Prime Minister; and an IGC expanded by representatives of the Governments413

and nominated representatives.”414

758.  It was common ground between the UK and US that the GC should be expanded

in size. The post-transition arrangements were expected to be the subject of “six weeks

of sustained effort” by Mr Brahimi in Iraq in mid-March.

759.  In an account of the visit written for Mr Blair, Sir Nigel explained that the UK view

was that the expansion of the GC should be substantial (to 75 or 100 members)

in order to make it more representative; the US preferred a more modest expansion

(to 35 or 50).415 Sir Nigel advised that the UK should not be dogmatic.

760.  Sir Nigel and Mr Sawers had argued for a new resolution to cover the UN role,

transitional structures and security arrangements.416 A letter from the GC to the Coalition

on security was also suggested by the UK attendees as “an additional demonstration of

Iraqi consent to the presence of Coalition Forces”. The note of the meeting concluded

that there seemed to be agreement on this point.

412  Letter Cannon to Owen, 17 February 2004, ‘Iraq: Sir Hilary Synnott’.

413  The Inquiry believes that this is a typing error and should read “Governorates”.

414  Letter Cannon to Owen, 21 February 2004, ‘Iraq: Sir Nigel Sheinwald’s Discussion with Condi Rice,

20 February’.

415  Minute Sheinwald to Prime Minister, 21 February 2004, ‘Visit to Washington, 20 February’.

416  Letter Cannon to Owen, 21 February 2004, ‘Iraq: Sir Nigel Sheinwald’s Discussion with Condi Rice,

20 February’.

330