The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
392.
Sir David
explained that the UK and US were committed to ridding Iraq of
WMD
and
recognised the need to remove the current Iraqi regime if military
action proved
necessary,
but the UK document avoided references to “liberation”. No firm
decision had
been taken,
but the likelihood was that the UK would publish its objectives if
and when
military
action was decided.
393.
After
discussion with Lord Goldsmith, a final version of the military
campaign
objectives
was placed in the House of Commons Library by Mr Hoon on 20
March.
394.
During
February, UK officials became increasingly concerned about the
risk
that the UK
might agree to take responsibility for a geographical sector of
Iraq
before the
implications had been examined.
395.
The UK
would not make a commitment to administer a division-sized
area
in the
medium to long term.
396.
The first
detailed estimate of the type (but not the size) of force required
to deliver
different
tasks was in Lt Gen Reith’s draft Concept of Operations for Phase
IV of 25
March. That
is addressed in Section 8.
397.
On 14
February, Mr Ehrman reported to Mr Peter Ricketts, FCO Political
Director,
that at a
“[Sir David] Manning meeting” on post-conflict issues, Sir David
had “expressed
strong
concern that junior CENTCOM planners seemed to be dreaming up an
ever
larger area
of Iraq for the UK to administer”.138
The Chiefs
of Staff had advised Mr Blair
that it
would be easier for the UK to play a smaller post-conflict role if
it was part of
a Coalition
fighting force; the opposite now seemed to be the
case.
398.
Sir David had
said that:
“[Mr
Richard] Armitage [US Deputy Secretary of State] was talking of
military
administration
for two years. The Pentagon seemed to be more sensible, talking
of
six months.
Did we [the UK] not need to reduce our 40,000 troops to around
5,000
by the end
of six months? And who would pay for all this? Some on the US
side
seemed to
be saying: you pay for what you administer.”
399.
Mr Ehrman
informed Mr Ricketts that Sir David Manning had asked the
MOD:
“… to get
the best information they could, at a senior level, on what size of
sector
was really
being proposed for the UK; and FCO, with MOD, then to let No.10
have
views on
the issues which would be involved in its administration, and how
we would
seek to
deal with these.”
138
Minute
Ehrman to Ricketts, 14 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Day
After’.
444