The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
916.
Beyond
comments about how to evaluate each option – as set out above –
the
paper made
no recommendation on troop withdrawals. It set out a number of
areas
in which
the UK could continue to contribute in the absence of a significant
military
presence in
Basra, evaluating the importance and the likely impact of UK
involvement.
They
were:
•
Progressing
politics, top down: continuing the intensive diplomatic efforts
in
Baghdad and
with the Kurds in Erbil, focusing particularly on resolving
the
Hydrocarbons
Law and securing provincial elections and progress on Kirkuk
and
the
constitutional review. This was assessed as high importance (“This
process
is slow and
iterative, but without it the spectre of civil war looms large”)
but only
medium
impact.
•
Progressing
politics, bottom up: continuing the reconciliation and
outreach
efforts led
by the UK military in Baghdad and building on the links with
JAM
established
in Basra. This was assessed as high importance and high
potential
UK
impact.
•
Economics:
continuing to make an important contribution to Iraqi-led growth
and
economic
reform, both in Baghdad and in Basra, where Mr Wareing’s
leadership
as co-chair
of the Basra Development Commission was “making real
progress”
(see
Section 10.2). This was assessed as of high importance, but low to
medium
UK impact,
because of the contrast with the “massive US effort”.
•
Security:
primarily military SSR and support for ISF on
operations.
No assessment
of importance or potential UK impact was given.
•
Governance
and security/justice sectors: continuing capacity-building
projects
in Baghdad
(not Basra), focused on security and justice sector reform. This
was
assessed as
of medium importance and medium impact.
•
Pressing
for more substantive multilateral and regional engagement by the
UN,
International
Monetary Fund and World Bank, assessed as high importance
and
high UK
impact (“We have more leverage with the EU, UN and World Bank
than
the
US”).
917.
FCO officials
concluded the paper with a consideration on the reputational risk
to
the UK of
withdrawing from Iraq:
“Reducing
UK effort in Iraq risks accusations that we are drawing down or
leaving
prematurely
and before the job is done, whenever we do it. The risk is more
acute
if we make
significant further reductions this year, leaving the ISF to deal
with any
spikes in
violence around the provincial/Presidential elections, and if the
US backfill.
Next year
the risk will be (somewhat) mitigated by reductions in the US’s own
force
levels, if
the security situation continues to improve, and if the US can be
persuaded
not to
backfill.
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