The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
426.
Mr Gaspar
Martins was “confident that the Council” represented “a
unified
coalition of
the willing to secure international peace and security”. Whatever
decision it
reached, it
was “pivotal” that it was “based on convincing and far-reaching
information”.
He
warned that:
“Whatever
decision we collectively take must be proportionate to the
gravity
of the issue
before us. That decision need not be popular; but it must be
justified.
The
consequences of a war clearly outweigh its benefits …”
427.
Mr Stefan
Tafrov, Bulgarian Permanent Representative to the UN, stated
that
Bulgaria
believed that Iraq’s co-operation was “unsatisfactory” and it was
unfortunate,
“as the
statements made by the chief inspectors have confirmed”, that the
Iraqi
authorities
were “still in material breach” of resolution 1441. Bulgaria hoped
that France’s
ideas would
be one element of the overall Security Council strategy to disarm
Iraq and
believed
that that goal could still be achieved through peaceful means. But
the Council
had
repeatedly warned Iraq of serious consequences if it did not
comply. Bulgaria
appealed to
the Council to “stand united”. That was “an essential condition for
a peaceful
outcome to
the crisis and for averting future threats”.
428.
Mr Fischer
stated that Iraq “must not be allowed to possess any weapons of
mass
destruction
and must disarm completely”. The inspectors had made “headway” and
their
presence
had “substantially diminished the danger emanating from Iraq”. They
“must be
given the
time to successfully complete their mission”. That required Iraq to
co-operate
fully,
unconditionally and actively if a “looming tragedy” was to be
averted.
429.
Mr Fischer
concluded:
“All
possible means for resolving the Iraqi crisis by peaceful means
must be
thoroughly
explored. Whatever decisions need to be made must be made by
the
Security
Council alone. It remains the only body internationally authorised
to do so.
“Military
action against Iraq would, in addition to the terrible
humanitarian
consequences,
above all endanger the stability of a tense and troubled
region.
The consequences
for the Near and Middle East could be catastrophic. There
should
be no
automatism leading to the use of military force. All possible
alternatives need
to be
exhaustively explored.”
430.
Iraq
continued to state that it did not possess weapons of mass
destruction.
431.
Mr Aldouri
stated that Iraq had agreed to act on resolution 1441 and had
“provided
everything
that might fall within the concept of pro-active Iraqi
co-operation”. The
documents
provided with the Iraqi declaration of 7 December 2002, required
“in-depth
study”
because they contained “updated relevant information responding to
many
questions”.
Iraq had “the right to wonder whether the declaration had been
studied with
due
diligence and thoroughness”. Iraq had “begun to co-operate
pro-actively”, and many
speakers
had called for that but there was a question about what that would
mean.
256