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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
The US National Intelligence Estimate
32.  On 1 October, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) produced its National
Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on ‘Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass
Destruction’.6
33.  An unclassified document based on the NIE, published on 4 October, included the
following judgements:
“Iraq has continued its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs in
defiance of UN resolutions and restrictions. Baghdad has chemical and
biological weapons as well as missiles with ranges in excess of UN restrictions;
if left unchecked, it probably will have a nuclear weapon during this decade.”
“Baghdad hides large portions of Iraq’s WMD efforts …”
“Since inspections ended in 1998, Iraq has maintained its chemical weapons effort,
energized its missile program, and invested more heavily in biological weapons;
most analysts assess Iraq is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program.”
“How quickly Iraq will obtain its first nuclear weapon depends on when it
acquires sufficient weapons-grade fissile material.”
“Baghdad has begun renewed production of chemical warfare agents, probably
including mustard, sarin, cyclosarin, and VX.” Iraq’s capability was “probably
more limited now” than it was in 1991, although VX production and agent
storage life had probably “been improved”. Iraq probably possessed “CW
[chemical warfare] bulk fill” for ballistic missile warheads “including for a limited
number of covertly stored, extended range Scuds”.
“All key aspects – R&D, production, and weaponization – of Iraq’s offensive BW
[biological warfare] program are active and most elements are larger and more
advanced than they were before the Gulf war.”
“Iraq maintains a small missile force and several development programs,
including for a UAV [unmanned aerial vehicle] that most analysts believe
probably is intended to deliver biological warfare agents.”7
34.  The discussion of Iraq’s biological warfare programme included reference to “a
large-scale, redundant, and concealed BW agent production capability, which includes
mobile facilities; these facilities can evade detection, are highly survivable, and can
exceed the production rates Iraq had prior to the Gulf war”.
35.  The discussion on the Iraqi nuclear programme referred to “Iraq’s aggressive
attempts to obtain proscribed high-strength aluminium tubes” and stated that all
“intelligence experts agree that Iraq is seeking nuclear weapons and that these tubes
6  CIA, 1 October 2002, ‘National Intelligence Estimate, Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of
Mass Destruction’.
7  CIA, 4 October 2002, Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs.
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