The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
32.
On 1 October,
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) produced its
National
Intelligence
Estimate (NIE) on ‘Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of
Mass
33.
An
unclassified document based on the NIE, published on 4 October,
included the
following
judgements:
•
“Iraq has
continued its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs
in
defiance of
UN resolutions and restrictions. Baghdad has chemical
and
biological
weapons as well as missiles with ranges in excess of UN
restrictions;
if left
unchecked, it probably will have a nuclear weapon during this
decade.”
•
“Baghdad
hides large portions of Iraq’s WMD efforts …”
•
“Since
inspections ended in 1998, Iraq has maintained its chemical weapons
effort,
energized
its missile program, and invested more heavily in biological
weapons;
most
analysts assess Iraq is reconstituting its nuclear weapons
program.”
•
“How
quickly Iraq will obtain its first nuclear weapon depends on when
it
acquires
sufficient weapons-grade fissile material.”
•
“Baghdad
has begun renewed production of chemical warfare agents,
probably
including
mustard, sarin, cyclosarin, and VX.” Iraq’s capability was
“probably
more
limited now” than it was in 1991, although VX production and
agent
storage
life had probably “been improved”. Iraq probably possessed
“CW
[chemical
warfare] bulk fill” for ballistic missile warheads “including for a
limited
number of
covertly stored, extended range Scuds”.
•
“All key
aspects – R&D, production, and weaponization – of Iraq’s
offensive BW
[biological
warfare] program are active and most elements are larger and
more
advanced
than they were before the Gulf war.”
•
“Iraq
maintains a small missile force and several development
programs,
including
for a UAV [unmanned aerial vehicle] that most analysts
believe
probably is
intended to deliver biological warfare agents.”7
34.
The discussion
of Iraq’s biological warfare programme included reference to
“a
large-scale,
redundant, and concealed BW agent production capability, which
includes
mobile
facilities; these facilities can evade detection, are highly
survivable, and can
exceed the
production rates Iraq had prior to the Gulf war”.
35.
The discussion
on the Iraqi nuclear programme referred to “Iraq’s
aggressive
attempts to
obtain proscribed high-strength aluminium tubes” and stated that
all
“intelligence
experts agree that Iraq is seeking nuclear weapons and that these
tubes
6
CIA, 1
October 2002, ‘National Intelligence Estimate, Iraq’s Continuing
Programs for Weapons of
Mass Destruction’.
7
CIA, 4
October 2002, Iraq’s
Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs.
296