The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
686.
One of the key
elements of the “Strategy for 2005” was “building up the
capability
of the
Iraqi Security Forces”. It predicted that the incoming Iraqi
Transitional Government
(ITG) would
regard security as a top priority and that they should be
“encouraged to
build on
Allawi’s new security plan” of which key elements were likely to
include:
•
an
overarching and visible Iraqi structure responsible for security,
under a single,
senior
minister;
•
effective
governance at provincial level to provide a political framework for
ISF
control;
•
developing
proposals on how to make SSR work and secure Iraqi ownership
of
the
plan;
•
adequate
top end capability, including agreement on the size of the
Iraqi
Intervention
Force (IIF) and Police Commandos and plans to deliver
them;
•
development
of a “policing plan” setting out the role of the police,
including
self‑protection,
development of a paramilitary capability, its relationship with
the
military,
and areas of police primacy; and
•
resolving
the de‑Ba’athification dilemma to allow SSR to work.
687.
The Strategy
proposed offering further UK assistance with:
•
continued
training effort in MND(SE);
•
development
of a strategy for the IPS (deployment of experienced,
senior
officers to
both the MOI and MNF could achieve considerable
impact);
•
provision
of suitably qualified and experienced advisers to mentor senior
Iraqi
officials
and support to build institutional capacity;
•
development
of Iraqi intelligence capability;
•
building on
MND(SE) practices to provide the conditions for handover to
Iraqi
regional
control as soon as practicable;
•
helping the
Iraqis to co‑ordinate international assistance; and
•
encouraging
other international forces (such as the Dutch and Portuguese)
to
keep at
least some forces in Iraq in a training role, to mitigate the
impact of their
withdrawal
from military operations.
688.
The paper
noted that there was no “silver bullet” for reforming the
ISF.
689.
The AHMGI
approved the paper on 9 February, subject to various points
including
the need to
cover judicial issues, which had not been addressed in the
Strategy.623
623
Minutes, 9
February 2005, Ad Hoc Ministerial Group on Iraq
meeting.
206