The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
828.
Sir Jeremy
reported that he had used “the points provided by the
Assessments
Staff”,
including Iraq’s:
“… capacity
to produce chemical and biological weapons; its delivery
mechanisms;
the efforts
the regime had taken to conceal WMD; the fact that the regime
had
considered
whether to declare some weapons but concluded it was too risky;
plans
to obstruct
… [the inspectors] if they got too close; and the intimidation to
prevent
private
interviews which Iraq saw as the weak link that could expose their
WMD”.
829.
In addition,
he stated that “UNMOVIC had been tagging proscribed
equipment
that had
been repaired by the Iraqis”.
830.
Directly
challenging the French/German/Russian proposal, Sir Jeremy
reported
that he had
said it “wrongly claimed inspections were not being hindered” and
“wrongly
suggested”
a number of other proposals to strengthen inspections and allow
more
time. It
“did not add up to a solution delivering disarmament, but at best
temporary
containment
while Iraq continued to exploit major holes in sanctions to develop
WMD”.
831.
Addressing the
legal arguments “using the lines agreed with London”, Sir
Jeremy
said that
the “new draft, if adopted, would confirm the authorisation of the
use of force
inherent in
resolutions 678, 687 and 1441”. It would increase the pressure on
Iraq; but it:
“… did not
necessarily mean that its adoption would in practice lead to
immediate
use of
force. There was still a chance that at the last minute Iraq would
take
radical
action to disarm. The UK hoped that would be the result. This was
the only
remaining
route to secure disarmament and a peaceful outcome.”
832.
Sir Jeremy
stated that he “recognised that [resolution] 1441 set an awkwardly
high
standard.
But we had adopted it and at no point had inspectors reported the
immediate,
active and
unconditional co-operation demanded”. He “accepted delay was
more
comfortable
and that there were downsides to the action … proposed”.
But colleagues
should read
the relevant provisions of resolution 687 (1991). Iraq “continued
to
cheat the UN”.
833.
Mr Jean-Marc
de La Sablière, French Permanent Representative to the
UN,
had
responded that Sir Jeremy’s statement showed that the resolution
“was not about
increased
pressure but about force”. He questioned whether the Council “would
be
strengthened
by supporting a war against which so many objected”. He set out
the
French/German/Russian
proposal “in standard terms”. There was “no reason to
resort
to force
in the current circumstances nor to discuss a resolution to
legitimise it”.
834.
Mr Wang
Yingfan, Chinese Permanent Representative to the UN, said
that
“the road
of peaceful inspections had not run its course”.
835.
Dr Gunter
Pleuger, German Permanent Representative to the UN, said
“the
resolution
was about war”. The goal was “peaceful disarmament – if we went to
war
we would
have failed”.
328