The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

278.  On 2 May, Mr Straw’s Private Secretary wrote to Mr Rycroft to propose that

Mr John Sawers, then British Ambassador to Egypt, should be appointed as the Prime

Minister’s Special Representative on Iraq to “take the lead for the UK in guiding the

political processes leading to the establishment of an Iraqi Interim Authority”.160

279.  On 2 May, Mr Hoon met Secretary Rumsfeld.161 Mr Hoon stressed the necessity

for ORHA to make tangible progress. Secretary Rumsfeld was reported to have:

“… played down expectations somewhat, and cautioned against waiting for a fully

formed organisation with a large pot of money. We should keep going pragmatically

and keep scratching round for contributions where they were available. This could

be done by the UK in their own area. Imposing order within the country would take

time; it would take effort to get the Ministries up and running and the people back

to work.”

280.  After a further video conference and comments from Sir Jeremy Greenstock,

Mr Bellinger sent through another draft of the post-conflict resolution on 4 May.162

281.  The following day Mr Brenton spoke to Mr Bellinger and others about the text,

which still crossed UK red lines on:

• the UN role, by not describing a clear role for the UN Special Co-ordinator in

setting up the IIA;

• the Oil-for-Food programme, which was extended for just three months in the

expectation that an IIA would be operating by this point; and

• oil sales, by introducing an “auditing” role rather than real-time monitoring.163

282.  The British Embassy Washington reported that US officials were optimistic that

text acceptable to the UK could be agreed, but clear that a difficult and protracted

negotiations might cause the US to walk away.

283.  In a telephone conversation with Mr Straw the next day, Secretary Powell

described continuing debate in the US system on the UN role and on the OFF

programme.164 Mr Straw wrote to Sir David Manning that the UK would need to “dig in”

on these points and that he had reiterated that the current proposals “crossed red lines”

for the UK.

160  Letter Owen to Rycroft, 2 May 2003, ‘Iraq: Appointment of a Special Representative’.

161  Minute Williams to Policy Director [MOD], [undated], ‘Visit of the US Secretary of Defense –

2 May 2003’.

162  Letter Bellinger to Rycroft, 4 May 2003, [untitled] attaching Paper, [undated], ‘Resolution on

post‑conflict Iraq’.

163  Telegram 589 Washington to FCO London, 5 May 2003, ‘Iraq: Draft UNSCR’.

164  Minute Straw to Manning, 5 May 2003, ‘Iraq: Draft UNSCR’.

178