6.5 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, January to
March 2003
I said, the
Geneva Conventions and the Hague Regulations, where we would
be
responsible
for the welfare of the people. And our main concern at that stage
would
be
establishing a secure environment and ensuring that humanitarian
relief was able
to get
through to those that needed it.
“But we
wanted that period to be as short as possible, after which we would
move
to some
interim administration authorised by the UN Security
Council.
“It was
clear, I think, on the eve of the invasion that we weren’t going to
have a
UN‑run
interim administration, but an interim administration authorised by
the
Security
Council was going to be good enough for us. And that would begin
the
process of
reform and reconstruction in Iraq and, at the same time, we
would
have the UN
involved in a political process in parallel that would lead to
some
kind of
convention or conference that would enable a new constitution to
emerge
and
elections on the basis of the new constitution, whereupon with a
new Iraqi
Government,
we could hand over power completely to the new Iraqi
Government.
And that
coalition security forces would be needed for as long as the new
Iraqi
Government
wanted them.”504
1174.
The
transition from conflict (Phase III) to post-conflict (Phase IV)
military
operations
began immediately Coalition troops started to occupy Iraqi
territory.
1175.
When that
transition began the Government had not taken firm
decisions
on the
nature or duration of the UK’s military commitment in post-conflict
Iraq or
on the
extent of the UK AOR. There had been no systematic analysis of the
UK’s
military or
civilian capacity to fulfil its likely obligations in the South in
a range of
circumstances,
including:
•
in the
prolonged absence of an authorising resolution;
•
in the
absence of additional Coalition partners;
•
in a
hostile security environment with low levels of Iraqi consent;
and
•
over
different timescales, in particular the medium and long
term.
1176.
Each of
those issues had been identified as a potential risk to UK
strategic
objectives
in Iraq, but no detailed contingency plans or preparations were in
place
to mitigate
those risks.
1177.
Ministers,
officials and the military continued to assume that:
•
there would
be early agreement on a post-conflict resolution;
•
levels of
consent would rise steadily across most of Iraq; and
504
Public
hearing, 8 December 2009, pages 33-35.
521