The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
847.
Reflecting
the need for ambiguity to secure consensus, the UK’s
Explanation
of Vote did
not directly address the issue of whether there should be a
further
resolution
and decision by the Security Council, stating only that, in the
event of
a report of
a further breach, the UK “would expect the Security Council to meet
its
responsibilities”.
848.
As Sir Jeremy
Greenstock had predicted, each member of the Security
Council
made a
statement explaining the basis for its vote, and in a number of
cases its
interpretation
of the provisions of the resolution.285
Many Member
States, including
the US and
the UK, stressed that resolution 1441 did not provide
“automaticity” for
the use
of force.
849.
Referring to
his statement on 17 October, during the Security Council’s
open
debate on
Iraq, Sir Jeremy Greenstock stated that there was “no shadow of
doubt” that
Iraq had
defied the UN and had sought to hinder and frustrate inspections
since 1991.
850.
Sir Jeremy
also stated:
•
“With the
adoption of this resolution the Security Council has clearly
stated
that the
United Nations will no longer tolerate this [Iraq’s] defiance.”
Iraq was
“being
given a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament
obligations;
a final opportunity
to remedy its material breach of resolution 687”. The
regime
in Baghdad
faced “an unequivocal choice: between complete disarmament
and
the serious
consequences indicated in paragraph 13” of the
resolution.
•
The
unanimous support of Council members sent the most powerful signal
that
Iraq could
no longer evade its obligations.
•
Because of
the strength of that signal there was “at last a chance” that
Iraq
would
“finally comply … and that military action can be
averted”.
•
The
provisions agreed in the resolution made the practical arrangements
set out
by the
inspectors legally binding. That would “reinforce international
confidence
in the
inspectors”. It would also, he hoped, “lead Iraq away from a fatal
decision
to conceal
weapons of mass destruction”.
•
The Council
had “heard loud and clear … the concerns about ‘automaticity’
and
‘hidden
triggers’ – the concern that on a decision so crucial we should not
rush
into
military action; that on a decision so crucial any Iraqi violations
should be
discussed
by the Council”.
•
As a
co‑sponsor of the resolution, the UK would be “equally clear in
response”.
There was:
“… no ‘automaticity’ in this resolution. If there is a further
Iraqi breach
of its
disarmament obligations, the matter will return to the Council for
discussion
as required
in paragraph 12.” The UK “would [then] expect the Security
Council
to meet its
responsibilities”.
285
UN Security
Council, ‘4644th Meeting Friday 8 November 2002’
(S/PV.4644).
346