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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
Introduction and key findings
1.  This Section addresses the immediate impact of the attacks on the US on
11 September 2001 (9/11), and the way in which that shaped the context in which
decisions on the policy towards Iraq were made.
2.  UK policy on Iraq before September 2001 is addressed in Section 1.
3.  The UK’s concerns about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
and the risk of terrorists acquiring and using such weapons, which pre-dated the attacks
on the US, and the Joint intelligence Committee (JIC) Assessments of that risk are
addressed in Section 4. That Section also addresses the UK’s assessments of Iraq’s
residual chemical, biological, nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities, its intent to
preserve and enhance those capabilities, and the likelihood of proliferation from Iraq.
4.  The roles and responsibilities of key individuals and bodies in the UK Government,
including the JIC, are set out in Section 2.
Key findings
After the attacks on the US on 9/11, Mr Blair declared that the UK would stand
“shoulder to shoulder” with the US to defeat and eradicate international terrorism.
Mr Blair took an active and leading role throughout the autumn of 2001 in building a
coalition to act against that threat, including taking military action against the Taliban
regime in Afghanistan.
Mr Blair also emphasised the potential risk of terrorists acquiring and using a nuclear,
biological or chemical weapon, and the dangers of inaction.
In relation to Iraq, Mr Blair sought to influence US policy and prevent precipitate
military action by the US, which he considered would undermine the success of the
coalition which had been established for action against international terrorism. He
recommended identifying an alternative policy which would command widespread
international support.
In December 2001, Mr Blair suggested a strategy for regime change in Iraq that
would build over time, including “if necessary” taking military action without losing
international support.
The tactics chosen by Mr Blair were to emphasise the threat which Iraq might pose,
rather than a more balanced consideration of both Iraq’s capabilities and intent; and
to offer the UK’s support for President Bush in an effort to influence his decisions
on how to proceed.
That remained Mr Blair’s approach in the months that followed.
UK policy on Iraq in early September 2001
5.  Since the end of the Gulf Conflict in 1991, the international community had pursued
a policy of “containment” towards Iraq. That was based on the provisions in a series
of United Nations (UN) Security Council resolutions intended to prevent Iraq from
developing WMD or threatening its neighbours and international peace and security.
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