The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
1.
This Section
addresses the immediate impact of the attacks on the US
on
11 September
2001 (9/11), and the way in which that shaped the context in
which
decisions
on the policy towards Iraq were made.
2.
UK policy on
Iraq before September 2001 is addressed in Section 1.
3.
The UK’s
concerns about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD)
and the
risk of terrorists acquiring and using such weapons, which
pre-dated the attacks
on the US,
and the Joint intelligence Committee (JIC) Assessments of that risk
are
addressed
in Section 4. That Section also addresses the UK’s assessments of
Iraq’s
residual
chemical, biological, nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities,
its intent to
preserve
and enhance those capabilities, and the likelihood of proliferation
from Iraq.
4.
The roles and
responsibilities of key individuals and bodies in the UK
Government,
including
the JIC, are set out in Section 2.
•
After the
attacks on the US on 9/11, Mr Blair declared that the UK would
stand
“shoulder
to shoulder” with the US to defeat and eradicate international
terrorism.
•
Mr Blair took
an active and leading role throughout the autumn of 2001 in
building a
coalition
to act against that threat, including taking military action
against the Taliban
regime in
Afghanistan.
•
Mr Blair also
emphasised the potential risk of terrorists acquiring and using a
nuclear,
biological
or chemical weapon, and the dangers of inaction.
•
In relation to
Iraq, Mr Blair sought to influence US policy and prevent
precipitate
military
action by the US, which he considered would undermine the success
of the
coalition
which had been established for action against international
terrorism. He
recommended
identifying an alternative policy which would command
widespread
international
support.
•
In December
2001, Mr Blair suggested a strategy for regime change in Iraq
that
would build
over time, including “if necessary” taking military action without
losing
international
support.
•
The tactics
chosen by Mr Blair were to emphasise the threat which Iraq might
pose,
rather than
a more balanced consideration of both Iraq’s capabilities and
intent; and
to offer
the UK’s support for President Bush in an effort to influence his
decisions
on how
to proceed.
•
That remained
Mr Blair’s approach in the months that followed.
5.
Since the end
of the Gulf Conflict in 1991, the international community had
pursued
a policy of
“containment” towards Iraq. That was based on the provisions in a
series
of United
Nations (UN) Security Council resolutions intended to prevent Iraq
from
developing
WMD or threatening its neighbours and international peace and
security.
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