The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

317.  On 5 August, at the request of the MOD, the JIC reviewed the likely attitude of

regional states to military action against Iraq.183 The JIC assessed that:

“Most regional governments would be happy to see Saddam’s demise. But

they would be likely to have profound misgivings about a campaign without a

well-constructed plan for a new Iraq. All agree that Iraq’s territorial integrity must

be maintained. But there are differing regional concerns about the place of the

Kurds and Shia in any new regime, the type of government and its relationship

with the West.”

318.  After a US attack began, “Iran would probably boost its support for Shia groups

working against Saddam”. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) “would

be likely to work directly to undermine US influence, eg by manipulating Iraqi groups

through propaganda and the selective provision of money and arms, although it would

not provoke anything that would provoke US military retaliation”.

319.  The JIC concluded that: “The US must continue to convince regional governments

of its determination and ability to remove Saddam quickly and offer credible plans for

the aftermath.”

320.  The Pigott Group discussed US and UK military planning on 8 August.184 Although

the MOD judged that progress had been made towards “a winning military concept”,

the Group expressed concern at the “absence of a clear strategy for the morning after”.

321.  The MOD reported on 12 August that President Bush had authorised

preparatory military activities.

322.  The British Embassy Washington described the “day after” as the “most

vexed” issue.

323.  Mr Straw warned Secretary Powell of the dangers of introducing democracy

to a country with no democratic tradition.

324.  A letter from Mr Hoon’s Private Office to No.10 on 12 August reported that

President Bush had authorised preparatory military activities costing $1bn and that

an inter-agency process in Washington had been launched.185

325.  Mr Tony Brenton, Deputy Head of Mission at the British Embassy Washington,

advised Mr Straw’s Private Office on 15 August that:

“Despite repeated affirmations that no decisions have yet been taken, there is a

general assumption that the [US] Administration is moving towards military action to

183  JIC Assessment, 5 August 2002, ‘Iraq: Regional Attitudes and Impact of Military Action’.

184  Minute Drummond to McKane, 8 August 2002, ‘Iraq’.

185  Letter Davies to Wechsberg, 12 August 2002, ‘Iraq: US contingency planning’.

166