4.4 | The
search for WMD
832.
Mr Blair
raised the ISG report during a video conference with President Bush
on
22 July.466
He said
that Mr Duelfer needed to prove that Saddam Hussein had
been
“procuring
the means to develop WMD, had missiles to deliver it, and the
intent to
use it”.
The ISG report could prove to be a powerful argument in support of
the war.
833.
Mr Blair
suggested that, with the ISG report and the Butler Review, which
had
made clear
that Al Qaida had been present in Iraq, “we could clearly argue
that it would
have been
wrong to let Saddam go unchecked”. The timing of the ISG report had
to be
right. Sir
Nigel Sheinwald noted that early September looked
realistic.
834.
Mr Dowse
discussed the ISG report with Mr Duelfer at a meeting hosted
by the
US Embassy
in London on 31 August.467
Mr Duelfer
stated that he did not expect the
report to
satisfy those wanting evidence of WMD, but thought it would
disappoint those
who said
that sanctions and containment had been working. There would be
plenty of
very clear
evidence that Iraqi abuse of OFF had allowed the regime to siphon
off “huge
amounts” of
money.
835.
Mr Dowse
reported that it was Mr Duelfer’s “firm intention” to deliver
the report to
Mr McLaughlin
by the end of September in a form suitable for immediate
publication.
A draft
should be ready for review by governments in Washington, London
and
Canberra in
about two weeks.
836.
Mr Blair
commented that Mr Duelfer needed:
“… a
conclusion on WMD weapons themselves. How clear is it that they
didn’t exist;
is it an
open question; how has the security situation post May 03 & now
affected the
search? He
will need answers to this.”468
837.
Mr Dowse
responded on 10 September. The UK had not seen the latest
text, but
Mr Duelfer
was expected to say that:
•
the ISG had
“not been able to determine conclusively whether
Saddam
possessed
WMD in 2003”; and
•
the
likelihood was that “even if some did exist, they were not of
military
838.
Mr Dowse
reported that Mr Duelfer remained “extremely (and rightly)
sensitive” to
leaks of
the report before publication, and particularly to any suggestion
that he may be
influenced
by Washington or London. Mr Dowse advised: “we must avoid a
repeat of the
allegations
that HMG exerted improper pressure on the last
report”.
466
Letter
Phillipson to Adams, 22 July 2004, ‘Prime Minister’s VTC with
President Bush, 22 July: Iraq and
MEPP’.
467
Minute
Dowse to Ehrman, 31 August 2004, ‘Next Iraq Survey
Report’.
468
Manuscript
comment Blair on Minute Dowse to Ehrman, 31 August 2004, ‘Next
Iraq Survey Report’.
469
Minute
Dowse to Phillipson, 10 September 2004, ‘Next Iraq Survey
Group Report’.
589