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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
that we have the trade‑offs that we need for mobility. The Snatch … provides us with
the mobility and level of protection that we need.
“We had RG31s in Bosnia, which we took out of service some time ago due to
the difficulties with maintenance. We have looked at the RG31 … and concluded
that the size and profile did not meet our needs. Size is important in the urban
environment. The RG31 cannot access areas that Snatch Land Rovers can get to.”
549.  Lieutenant General Nicholas Houghton, who succeeded AM Torpy as CJO in
March 2006, visited Iraq from 13 to 15 June.287 He reported:
“… I do have some concerns as I look ahead over the balance of the year …
If we are to match the wider campaign desire for a decisive six months we need
to balance ourselves accordingly.”
550.  On reducing troops and equipment in Iraq, he stated:
“Do not look for too big a dividend this year. Particularly we need to retain as much
Warrior … as LAND can afford. The reality is that Warrior gives us confidence and
a protective edge over EFPs. The boys can manage Snatch – just; but they have
no inherent confidence in it.”
551.  Mr Ingram gave evidence about Snatch Land Rovers to the Defence Select
Committee on 20 June.288 He said that there was no “off‑the‑shelf” solution that would
offer the “all‑round protection we would seek with the same utility and manoeuvrability”.
552.  Mr Ingram told the Committee that there was “a balance of risk” that needed to
be taken. While the MOD was “very conscious of where the threats were coming from”,
they did “not necessarily have every capacity to deal with those threats”.
553.  On 26 June, Mr Browne announced a review of armoured vehicles in Parliament.289
He stated:
“As I have already said to the House, it is open for commanders to deploy vehicles
that have heavier protection than the Snatch Land Rover … Other vehicles are
available to them; there is a choice. However, commanders must be free to make
decisions in relation to the operations for which they deploy soldiers. I have already
said to the House that I am aware of the issue: I could not but be aware of it
following my visit last week and, indeed, my earlier visit. I have asked for a review
of what we can do in the long term and immediately. I shall see what we can do
immediately to respond to the changing situation, although significant measures
other than those in relation to the vehicle’s armour must be taken. We are at the
leading edge of some of them, and electronic counter‑measures, in particular.”
287  Minute Houghton to PSO/CDS, 16 June 2006, ‘Visit to Iraq 13 – 15 Jun 06’.
288  Thirteenth Report from the House of Commons Defence Committee, Session 2005‑06, UK Operations
in Iraq, HC 1241.
289  House of Commons, Official Report, 26 June 2006, column 7.
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