10.2 | Reconstruction: July 2004 to July 2009

848. DFID also told the Inquiry that it decided not to revise the I-CAP because of:

• the consistency in DFID “strategic priorities” and funding between 2005

and 2007;

• the high turnover of Heads of DFID Baghdad; and

• from 2007, DFID’s move away from producing published CAPs (under

Mr Douglas Alexander).

849. A Cabinet Office official advised Mr Brown on 12 October that Governor Waili’s

appeal against his dismissal from post had been successful.496 The UK planned to

“resume low-key co-operation with him in the interests of moving beyond the political

stand-off in Basra” while the Iraqi Government took other steps towards his dismissal.

The security situation in Basra remained “relatively calm”.

850. Major General Graham Binns, GOC MND(SE), reported on 18 October that

Gen Petraeus had agreed Lt Gen Odierno’s recommendation of PIC for Basra in

December.497

851. In a message to the FCO in London on 23 October, Mr Christopher Prentice,

British Ambassador to Iraq, set out some of the implications of Mr Brown’s 8 October

statement.498

852. Mr Prentice argued that given the UK’s strategic interests and the scale and cost

of its commitment to Iraq so far, “we [the UK] need to accept now that we are in this for

some years to come”.

853. The UK would be judged by the progress Basra made following PIC. By the end

of 2008, key Basra economic initiatives would only just have started and would need

continuing UK support. There was also a case for the UK “planning a last high profile

project as visible proof for Basrawis of our continuing support and as a lasting UK

legacy”.

854. Mr Prentice reported that the UK was already increasing its emphasis on the

“civilian development agenda”. In the longer term, DFID “understandably wish to

normalise its role in a wealthy oil-producing country i.e. close its programme”. It

would be right to do so – but only when the “whole Iraq project” was on track. Unless

the UK was “surprised by success”, 2009 was likely to be too early to begin to close

the programme.

855. The conditions might be favourable by 2009 to re-establish a UK Trade and

Industry presence in Basra “to pursue the huge commercial opportunities there will

eventually be there”.

496 Minute Cabinet Office [junior official] to Prime Minister, 12 October 2007, ‘Iraq – Weekly Update’.

497 Report Binns, 18 October 2007, ‘GOC HQ MND(SE) – southern Iraq Update – 18 October 2007’.

498 eGram 43230/07 Baghdad to FCO London, 23 October 2007, ‘Iraq 2009 and Beyond – Unfinished

Business’.

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