9.6 |
27 June 2007 to April 2008
helpful as
it would require us to make some significant commitments and,
potentially,
make it
difficult for us to meet expectations” so he suggested that they
should look at
“alternative
confidence building measures” instead.
732.
In a letter to
Mr Browne’s Private Secretary on 7 January, Mr Brown’s
Private
Secretary
said that the Prime Minister preferred to defer decisions and
announcements
on force
levels in Iraq until after the final review had taken place at the
end of
February.347
The
decision would need to be taken “in the light of advice from
military
commanders,
a full assessment of conditions on the ground, a further effort
to
internationalise
Iraq-handling … and a review of the progress of the Kuwait
Support
Facility”.
733.
The same
Private Secretary also wrote to Mr Miliband’s Private
Secretary, with
Mr Brown’s
response to the report of Mr Miliband’s visit.348
734.
Mr Brown
agreed with Mr Miliband’s conclusions on the 2008 Iraq
strategy and
was content
for him to proceed as outlined. In particular, he was “keen to work
hard to
persuade
the US of the need to support early provincial elections” and
agreed strongly
on the
importance of “further internationalising the effort”.
735.
On 7 January,
Mr McDonald and Ms Aldred met members of the US
Administration
and
explored US thinking on future force levels in
Iraq.349
Mr McDonald
explained that
the UK was
continuing to plan on the basis of a reduction in UK troops in
March or April,
but that
the latest military advice was that the reduction should be to
around 2,700 to
2,800; not
2,500 as previously envisaged. Options for beyond November 2008
were
under
consideration but the UK would be constrained once the resolution
expired.
736.
Mr McDonald
and Ms Aldred were told that the US had not ruled out a
further
resolution
completely, only that there would not be another under Chapter
VII.
737.
Lt Gen
Houghton told the Chiefs of Staff at their 8 January meeting that
HQ
MND(SE) had
assessed that the impact of the Australian withdrawal on UK
forces
would be
“minimal”.350
Around 105
embedded personnel would remain. Danish troops
had already
withdrawn, and Czech forces were due to do so in June, leaving
Romanian
forces
alongside those of the UK.
738.
Gen Dannatt
visited Basra and Baghdad between 13 and 15 January and had
an
“extremely
useful” meeting with Gen Petraeus, who outlined options to use US
forces to
backfill
into Muthanna and Dhi Qar provinces once the Australian forces
withdrew.351
347
Letter
Fletcher to Forber, 7 January 2008, ‘Iraq: Force
Levels’.
348
Letter
Fletcher to Hickey, 7 January 2008, ‘Iraq’.
349
Minute
Aldred to McDonald, 7 January 2008, ‘Meeting with Eliot Cohen and
Eric Edelman’.
350
Minutes, 8
January 2008, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
351
Minute CGS
to Various, 21 January 2008, ‘CGS Visit to Iraq 13-15 Jan
08’.
317