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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
told by everyone that it was not on. Had that been the case, we would have stopped
much earlier.”527
1367.  At the time he gave evidence, Sir Kevin had not had the telegrams from Ankara
drawn to his attention.528
1368.  Sir Kevin confirmed that there had been a majority vote in the Turkish Parliament
but that it was not sufficiently large to approve the deployment.529
1369.  In relation to Mr Hoon’s visit in January 2003, Mr Lee told the Inquiry:
“As I recall … that was a sort of last throw of the dice really, that everyone else had
tried, hadn’t had an outright ‘no’, but hadn’t had any sort of encouragement either.
So we should try this. He [Hoon] should go, speak to his opposite numbers, as many
people as possible in the Turkish hierarchy, and see what the result would be. The
outcome of that visit was, I think, the realisation dawned that Turkey was not going
to agree. So things moved on, away from the northern option.”530
Should the UK have addressed an alternative to the northern
option earlier and more seriously?
1370.  The need for a northern axis for any invasion of Iraq was suggested to the
US by the UK military in July 2002.
1371.  The MOD’s preference for a discrete role in northern Iraq was identified in
July 2002 and it remained the preferred option until the end of the year.
1372.  The evidence set out in this Section catalogues the advice, offered by
PJHQ to the MOD and the MOD advice to Mr Hoon and Mr Blair between July and
December 2002, on the strategic rationale for both northern and southern axes of
attack in an invasion of Iraq, and the advantages of the northern option from the
UK’s perspective.
1373.  The proposal reflected long‑held and legitimate judgements about the difficulties
which could arise during operations if ground forces at a brigade level or below were
embedded within US structures.
1374.  A briefing note for Mr Hoon on 11 December 2002 explicitly confirmed that the
northern option “came from our strategic analysis in the first place”.531
527 Private hearing, 6 May 2010, pages 17‑18.
528 Private hearing, 6 May 2010, page 17.
529 Private hearing, 6 May 2010, page 18.
530 Private hearing, 22 June 2010, pages 29‑30.
531 Minute Johnson to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], 11 December 2002, ‘Iraq: Military Planning – Turkey
Handling’.
376
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