3.2 |
Development of UK strategy and options, January to April 2002 –
“axis of evil” to Crawford
“What
remains unclear is how the US will handle the UN track, above all
the
inspection
regime. The Administration’s repeated high-profile demands
for
inspections
suggest that the US will want to issue some sort of ultimatum, but
set
the bar so
high that Iraq will never comply in practice (Armitage [Richard
Armitage,
US Deputy
Secretary of State] as much as stated this to PUS [the FCO
Permanent
Under
Secretary] in January). Our objective remains to persuade the US …
that they
must show
that they are serious about implementing the resolutions – even if
only to
prepare the
ground properly in the international community for action if Saddam
fails
to
comply.
“There is a
clear tension between the argument for preparing international
opinion
(which
leaves open the possibility of coercing Iraq into some real
disarmament
measures
under the threat of US military action), and the arguments for
striking
swiftly and
with maximum surprise … So although the goal of US policy may be
ever
firmer, the
way to get there is not.”
40.
Sir
Christopher concluded that Vice President Cheney’s visit in early
March “may
or may not
be the main vehicle for consulting the UK. But it would be wise to
assume
that by
then, the US will have a reasonably clear vision, for which they
will want our
endorsement.”
41.
Summarising
the issues, the telegram predicted:
“The
Administration appears to be gearing up for a decision on removing
Saddam,
but are not
quite there yet. The ‘how’ is still difficult. The debate looks
likely to come
to a head
this month. The likeliest outcome is some combination of an
ultimatum
on weapons
inspectors, backing of opposition forces, and US military
intervention.
Cheney’s
visit to the region in mid-March is likely to be on the critical
path of US
diplomacy
leading to action. We need to encourage the US to build
international
legitimacy
for action, but there may be a tension between this and
operational
considerations.”
42.
Mr William
Ehrman, FCO Director International Security, reported that a
meeting
with Sir
David Manning “and some others”, had discussed Sir Christopher
Meyer’s
telegram
“and the question of legal considerations related to military
action against
43.
Mr Ehrman said
he had outlined the legal difficulty in trying to argue that
WMD
development
posed an “‘imminent’ threat”. Sir David Manning had asked
whether
another
justification for action could be the “flouting of UN SCRs
[Security Council
resolutions]”.
Mr Ehrman had advised that his understanding was that “a further
SCR
would be
required to authorise military action”; and that: “It seemed highly
unlikely
that the
US would be willing to seek such a resolution or, even if they did,
that they
would get it.”
14
Minute
Ehrman to Goulty, 13 February 2002, ‘US/Iraq’.
395