The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
freedom of
manoeuvre and inhibited SSR by necessitating the movement of
military
resources
away from SSR and onto security and stability operations and
self-protection.
473.
On Basra
province, Maj Gen Dutton wrote:
“… there is
still much work to be done (in particular with the Police) but we
are going
to remain
in Basra for the longest time. I continue to believe that we can
assist in an
internal
reformation of the Basra Police if we really want to … The more
resources
we can
apply, the quicker they [the Iraqis] can be ready to take control
themselves.”
474.
Mr Blair
and President Bush spoke by video conference on 13 December, two
days
before the
Iraqi election.222
Mr Blair
said things were “looking good” for the election and
proposed
pushing for a new government to be in place by the end of January.
He felt
that “there
was a sense of ordinary politics for the first time”.
475.
Mr Blair
also felt that a “turning point” may have been reached on
Sunni
engagement,
with some Sunni leaders distancing themselves from the insurgency
and
wanting to
participate in the political process.
476.
On 14
December, the eve of the Iraqi election, the JIC updated its July
2005
assessment
of the Sunni insurgency in Iraq.223
Its Key
Judgements included:
“I. In
Sunni areas of central and northern Iraq the insurgency is firmly
entrenched
and shows
no sign of diminishing. The underlying long-term trend of attacks
has
been
upwards. Sectarian violence has also continued to
escalate.
“II. The
driving force of the insurgency are Iraqi Arab
Sunni nationalists. They
are
responsible
for most attacks … dialogue between Sunni insurgents and
politicians
is
increasing and they share some political goals. Improved Sunni
political cohesion
could
strengthen the ability of Sunni politicians to influence the
insurgents …
…
“IV. Not
all Sunni expectations will be met but if the next Iraqi government
could
deliver on
at least some, alienation of the Sunni community could be reduced
…
The
possibility of isolating the jihadists and other hard-core
rejectionists could be
enhanced,
although the risk of sectarian violence will remain.
“V. In such
circumstances the Iraqi Sunni Arab nationalist insurgency might
slowly
begin to
reduce. But a hard-core is likely to remain irreconcilable and
reject the
political
process. We continue to judge that a significant insurgency in
Sunni areas
will
persist beyond 2006.
“VI.
The jihadists
also reject
the political process and are determined to fight on.
They are a
minority within the overall insurgency but have disproportionate
impact:
222
Letter
Quarrey to Siddiq, 13 December 2005, ‘Prime Minister’s VTC with
President Bush: Middle East’.
223
JIC
Assessment, 14 December 2005, ‘The Iraqi Sunni Insurgency: Where
Next?’
568