Executive
Summary
•
Delays in
providing adequate medium weight Protected Patrol Vehicles
(PPVs)
and the
failure to meet the needs of UK forces in MND(SE) for ISTAR
and
helicopters
should not have been tolerated.
•
The MOD was
slow in responding to the developing threat in Iraq
from
Improvised
Explosive Devices (IEDs). The range of protected mobility
options
available
to commanders in MND(SE) was limited. Although work had
begun
before 2002
to source an additional PPV, it was only ordered in July
2006
following
Ministerial intervention.
•
Funding was
not a direct barrier to the identification and deployment
of
additional
solutions to the medium weight PPV gap. But it appears that
the
longer‑term
focus of the Executive Committee of the Army Board on
the
Future
Rapid Effect System programme inhibited it from addressing the
more
immediate
issue related to medium weight PPV capability.
•
The
decision to deploy troops to Afghanistan had a material impact on
the
availability
of key capabilities for deployment to Iraq, particularly
helicopters
and ISTAR.
822.
The following
key findings are from Section 15.2, and relate to evidence
in
Section 15.1:
•
Before the
invasion of Iraq, the Government had made only minimal
preparations
for the deployment of civilian personnel.
•
There was
an enduring gap between the Government’s civilian capacity
and
the level
of its ambition in Iraq.
•
There was
no overarching consideration by the Government of the extent
to
which
civilians could be effective in a highly insecure environment, or
of the
security
assets needed for civilians to do their jobs
effectively.
•
The
evidence seen by the Inquiry indicates that the Government
recognised its
duty of
care to UK‑based and locally engaged civilians in Iraq. A
significant effort
was made to
keep civilians safe in a dangerous environment.
823.
The following
key findings are from Section 16.4, and relate to evidence
in
Sections
16.1 to 16.3:
•
In 2002,
the UK military was already operating at, and in some cases
beyond,
the limits
of the guidelines agreed in the 1998 Strategic
Defence Review.
As
a result,
the Harmony Guidelines were being breached for some units
and
specialist
trades.
•
The
Government’s decision to contribute a military force to a US‑led
invasion
of Iraq
inevitably increased the risk that more Service Personnel
would be put
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