The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
577.
On
31 January, Lt Gen Reith wrote to Adm Boyce that one
of the areas that “may
cause
difficulty” as Op TELIC developed was asset
tracking.304
He
wrote:
“All that
can be achieved in the time available is being progressed. The
integration
of the
current system (VITAL … ) and UOR provision of TAV (Total Asset
Visibility, a
US System)
offers considerable improvement, but is nonetheless a ‘quick fix’
which
does not
fully address the capability gap. Medium term work by DLO is in
hand.”
578.
In his
post-operation report, Brig Binns stated:
“An
inability to track items … all contributed to a serious impact upon
the morale of
soldiers
about to conduct operations.”305
579.
When Maj Gen
Fry was interviewed by the NAO on 7 August, the report of
the
interview
sent to Mr Lee stated he had cited poor asset tracking as a
“negative aspect”
of Op
TELIC.306
It
“compounded the lack of availability of certain scarce resources”
and
was quoted
as saying “we had it but couldn’t find it!”
580.
The MOD DOC
report on 17 October 2003 stated:
“During
Operation TELIC, the flow of logistic information up and down the
supply
chain and
between all stakeholders was poor. For example it was difficult to
track
UORs
through to the end user in order to match the equipment with
relevant training
581.
On asset
tracking it stated:
“Large
amounts of equipment, stores and supplies were reportedly ‘lost’ in
theatre,
including
ammunition, ECBA & NBC Defence equipment … It was not
possible
to track
down high priority equipment that was arriving simultaneously with
the
sustainment
flow. As a result UORs and other priority equipment could not
be
targeted
for rapid processing. This inability to identify the exact location
of equipment
resulted in
the degradation of operational capability.”
582.
In its
Lessons for
the Future report in
December 2003, the MOD stated:
“… the flow
of logistics information between theatre and the UK was
poor,
particularly
affecting the tracking of UORs into theatre. It was difficult to
monitor the
rates at
which supplies were consumed, making it hard to determine when
re-supply
would be
required. The lack of available information also reduced
commanders’
confidence
in the logistics system, causing units to over-prioritise their
requests
304
Minute CJO
to PSO/CDS, 31 January 2003 ‘OP JACANA Lessons for Op
TELIC’.
305
Report,
6 June 2003, ‘7th Armoured Brigade Post Operation Report &
Lessons Report – Operation
TELIC’.
306
Minute DCJO
to DG Op Pol, 7 August 2003, ‘Readout of NAO Interview with
DCJO(Ops) – 7 Aug 03’.
307
Report DOC,
17 October 2003, ‘Operation TELIC Lessons Study’.
94