9.5 |
June 2006 to 27 June 2007
who would
be pulled out were involved only in static guarding, of bases which
we
intended to
close in any case.”
436.
ACM Stirrup
said that Gen Casey understood and was comfortable with the idea
of
the UK
drawing down to 4,500 troops by May:
“His
concerns centred on the idea of ‘leaving Basra unattended’ (which
we did not
plan to
do), the performance of the police, and Iranian activity. Moreover,
Gates had
agreed that
the coalition should aim to get out of the centre of Iraqi
cities.”
437.
Mr Blair
asked about work on joint civilian and military structures to
deliver
“assistance”
in Basra, as proposed by Maj Gen Shirreff. ACM Stirrup said that it
was too
late in the
day to implement Maj Gen Shirreff’s proposal; building capacity in
the Iraqi
system was
now the focus and should not be militarily‑led. Co‑location of
civilian and
military
personnel at Basra Air Station would help.
438.
On 17 January,
the JIC assessed developments in Iraqi security strategy,
the
readiness
of the ISF and prospects for transition of security to Iraqi
control.235
439.
The Assessment
said that sectarian violence had deepened over the
past
six months,
and attacks on the MNF were “reaching new highs”. There had
been
“no coherent
Iraqi national security strategy in response”.
“I. The
Iraqi Government’s approach to security reflects its sectarian
make‑up:
the Shia
and Kurds want to take control of security in their own areas
first. Plans
for dealing
politically with the Sunni Arab insurgency remain unclear. There is
no
coherent
Iraqi national security strategy.
“II. The
lack of united national political direction is reflected in Iraq’s
national security
machinery
which remains unco‑ordinated and only partially effective:
undermined
by personal
and party rivalries, endemic corruption and the absence of a
capable
bureaucracy.
This is unlikely to change significantly in the foreseeable
future.
…
“V. The
success of new US plans will depend in part on the willingness of
the Iraqi
Government
to take on sectarian and political militias. Maliki will not take
action
which risks
breaking the Shia United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) and bringing down
his
government.
Only a small proportion of the ISF are currently both willing and
able
to take
on the Shia militias.”
441.
A summary of
contact with JAM1, produced by a senior government
official
specialising
in the Middle East (1) in 2007, said that in late 2006 officials
“began to look
235
JIC
Assessment, 17 January 2007, ‘Iraqi Security Forces: Prospects in
2007’.
81