10.1 | Reconstruction: March 2003 to June 2004

1010. The possibility of a “reconstruction gap”, which had been identified by Sir Hilary

Synnott on 22 January, was not explicitly acknowledged in the Plan.

1011. In a briefing for Mr Straw (as Chair of the AHMGIR), the Cabinet Office warned

that DFID’s intended focus on capacity-building, leaving capital and large-scale

rehabilitation projects to other donors, might be controversial:

“This formation is fine in principle but depends on other donor funds, particularly

from the US Supplemental [IRRF2], being disbursed on time. US contracts are being

let now but if there are delays in implementation due to security or bureaucracy there

could be a reconstruction gap in the South this autumn.”589

1012. Ministers endorsed the Plan and agreed that the UK should press the US to reach

decisions on its future support in southern Iraq.590

1013. On 23 April, Mr Blair received the first edition of all 15 “unvarnished accounts”

commissioned by Sir Nigel Sheinwald on 19 April, plus an additional four reports

covering essential services, oil, next year’s budget and Ambassador Bremer’s recent

speech in Tikrit.591

1014. The reports relating to the political situation and security are described in Section

9.2; the account relating to Security Sector Reform is described in Section 12.1.

1015. The report on the Iraqi media identified three key challenges (tackling the

pan‑Arab satellite channels, improving Al Iraqiya, and strengthening the capacity of

the Iraqi Government) and set out how the UK should address them.592

1016. The report on reconstruction was Mr Richmond’s 18 April report on the challenges

of designing and executing reconstruction in a conflict zone.593

1017. The report on essential services stated that delivery of most services was poor.594

A reliable electricity supply remained key to the delivery of other services but the

Coalition continued to fail to meet public expectations; widely publicised CPA targets

for electricity generation for summer 2003 had not been met and it was unlikely that the

CPA’s target of 6,000MW by 30 June 2004 would be achieved. Food, sanitation and

fuel were less problematic. Food supplies had been temporarily interrupted by recent

fighting, but there was no evidence of significant food shortages. There was some

589 Annotated Agenda, 21 April 2004, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation meeting.

590 Minutes, 22 April 2004, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation meeting.

591 Minute Rycroft to Prime Minister, 23 April 2004, ‘15 Reports on Iraq’.

592 Paper, [undated], ‘Media in Iraq’.

593 Telegram 173 IraqRep to FCO London, 18 April 2004, ‘Iraq: Effects of the Recent Crisis on

Reconstruction’.

594 Telegram 180 IraqRep to FCO London, 20 April 2004, ‘Iraq: Essential Services (Excluding Oil)’.

175