3.8 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 8 to 20 March
2003
740.
In the light
of misunderstandings in the Council, Sir Jeremy explained
that
the co‑sponsors:
“… were not
withdrawing the resolution but, instead, not putting it to a
vote.
The key to
any chance for diplomacy lay in our being convinced that Iraq
would
co‑operate
within the terms of 1441. The Council had failed to find that key
and
unlock the
possibility of further inspections. On the authorisation for force
…
I would be
circulating the view our Attorney General had given earlier that
day.”
741.
Dr Blix
told the Council that the UNMOVIC draft programme identifying
key
tasks would
be available that afternoon, and that with a pro-active attitude it
would
take Iraq
“months” to complete.
742.
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock reported that Dr Blix had told the Council
that:
•
UNMOVIC’s
draft work programme would be available that
afternoon.
It identified
12 key tasks. With a pro-active Iraqi attitude, all
disarmament
tasks would
take months to complete.
•
The UK had
set out a smaller group of tasks and UNMOVIC would accept a
time
set down by
the Council and then report for it to judge compliance. Some
issues
would take
little time with Iraqi co-operation (eg interviews, missile
destruction
and UAVs).
But others – anthrax and mobile labs – were more difficult: it
would
not take
long to present materials if they existed, but it could take longer
to prove
their
non-existence.
•
While there
had been pro-active Iraqi co-operation in recent days
(including
further
efforts to convince UNMOVIC that anthrax/VX had been destroyed
and
footage of
mobile sites), Dr Blix could not offer conclusions until he
had a view
from his
experts.
•
It was not
clear whether the pro-active Iraqi co-operation covered all
areas.256
743.
Mr Annan
announced the withdrawal of the inspectors.
744.
Mr Annan
told the Security Council that, following the US call to
evacuate
personnel,
he had decided to withdraw:
•
all UN
humanitarian personnel from Iraq, which could lead to the
suspension
of the
Oil-for-Food programme;
•
UNMOVIC and
IAEA inspectors; and
•
troops and
personnel in the UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission
(UNIKOM).257
745.
Sir Jeremy
commented that delegations would be waiting for President
Bush’s
speech, but
the “danger of blow-back in the Security Council and General
Assembly”
256
Telegram
464 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 18 March 2003, ‘Iraq:
Resolution’.
257
Telegram
464 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 18 March 2003, ‘Iraq:
Resolution’.
531