The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
405.
The Assessment
contained statements relating to the development of
missile
systems
including:
•
Iraq was
using multiple Volga engines (the Al Samoud missile had only
one
engine).
The missile designs were judged to be “credible”; Iraq had
“previous
experience
with multiple engine systems”. The twin engine missile “would
have
had a range
approaching that of the Al Hussein (650km)”, but “a much
smaller
payload”.
•
Work had
not been undertaken after early 2002.
•
There was
“currently no evidence to link the 380 illicitly procured Volga
engines
to these
designs, although the number purchased was probably in excess of
that
required
for the Al Samoud programmes”.
•
Intelligence
pre-conflict had indicated possible work on a long-range
derivative
of the SCUD
missile, with a range of around 1,200km, but all those
interviewed
had stated
that they were unaware of any continuing work on a
SCUD-based
system.
•
There had
been design work on developing the short-range Al
Fatah
(Ababil 100)
missile.
406.
The Assessment
concluded that it was not clear why development of the
designs
for
prohibited missile systems had been halted. There was a clear
intent to preserve the
designs for
future use and UNMOVIC inspectors had been deceived during
interviews.
Areas for
further investigation included:
•
“the issue
of chemical and biological warheads”;
•
“the
purpose of missile infrastructure such as the Al Rafah test stand”;
and
•
“the extent
of foreign technical and material assistance”.
407.
Sir John
Scarlett told the Inquiry that after this Assessment:
“… there
wasn’t a further formal JIC Assessment until the end of the
following year,
23 December
2004, when there was a formal review of JIC judgements in
2002,
which took
account of the ISG final report which had been issued in October
2004.
“But in
case anybody thinks that therefore the JIC wasn’t looking at it at
that time, it
certainly
was, but it was doing it through the process of reporting from,
contact with,
monitoring
of, participation in, through British representatives, the work of
the ISG
on the
ground. There were regular reports coming in and then being
disseminated to
No.10 and
to JIC members, and that is how the work of the ISG was
tracked.”210
210
Private
hearing, 5 May 2010, page 59.
504