6.5 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, January to
March 2003
302.
The request
appears to have been overtaken by a further Ministerial meeting
on
humanitarian
issues on 13 February at which DFID, the FCO and the MOD were
asked
by
Mr Blair to co-ordinate advice for him to use with President
Bush.150
303.
In separate
letters to Mr Blair on 10 February, Mr Straw and
Mr Hoon endorsed
Ms Short’s
views on improved co-operation between departments.
304.
Mr Straw
told Mr Blair that DFID, the MOD and the Cabinet Office had
been
co-operating
closely on humanitarian issues.151
Work on
humanitarian and other
long-term
planning issues would be strengthened by the creation of the
IPU.
305.
Mr Straw
commented that humanitarian planning was the area of “long-term
work”
where the
UK probably had fewest differences with the US. It was an area,
unlike some
others,
where the US seemed to agree on the need for close UN involvement.
The US
and UK
Missions in New York were working on the fine-tuning of OFF
arrangements to
make them
better suited to the circumstances of post-conflict Iraq. In
addition, the US
military
was:
“…
developing detailed plans for relief and reconstruction teams to
follow in the
wake of
advancing military forces in Iraq to begin immediately the urgent
tasks of
restoring
water and electricity supplies and repairing public buildings. The
US are
clearly
aware of the importance of delivering quick wins to show the Iraqi
people and
the world
the benefits of Coalition action.”
306.
Mr Straw
explained that much work remained to be done on
economic
reconstruction.
An inter-departmental visit to Washington that week had revealed
that,
although
there were, “as always”, clear differences between US government
agencies,
there did
still seem to be an opportunity to influence their
thinking.
307.
Mr Hoon
responded to Ms Short’s question about the scale of the UK
humanitarian
contribution.152
He accepted
that, in the “very short term”, the UK military would
play
“a very
significant role”, but early thought would also need to be given to
the timing of
transition
to purely civil structures. The key issue was to resolve
differences with the
US over
the role of the UN.
308.
A JIC
Assessment on 10 February warned of the possibility of
terrorist
attacks
against Coalition Forces in Iraq, during and after
conflict.
309.
On 10
February, at the request of the MOD and the FCO, the JIC produced
its
second
Assessment on the potential terrorist threat in the event of
conflict in Iraq.153
310.
The earlier
Assessment, produced on 10 October 2002, is described in
Section 6.4.
150
Letter
Cannon to Bewes, 13 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Humanitarian
Issues’.
151
Minute
Straw to Prime Minister, 10 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Humanitarian
Planning’.
152
Letter Hoon
to Blair, 10 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Humanitarian
Planning’.
153
JIC
Assessment, 10 February 2003, ‘International Terrorism: War with
Iraq’.
363