4.2 | Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002

509. Mr Owen agreed with Mr Sedwill. He suggested that the Foreword needed:

“… to refer to the UN in the first sentences. This is after all, about the authority

of the UN and international law. This is the only way we can win the argument

in Parliament and elsewhere …”254

510. Mr Straw suggested that the Foreword for the dossier “should be in a narrative

form” by Mr Blair, and that it needed “a killer” paragraph on “Saddam’s defiance of the

UN, only annexation of another member state and unprecedented use of WMD”.255

511. Writing before the decision had been taken that Mr Blair would sign the Foreword

or the text had been drafted, Mr Bowen wrote:

“I take it as read that the Foreword is a political piece, signed by the Prime Minister

or another Minister. In that text it would be useful to make the point that what follows

is the work of officials drawing on sensitive intelligence material. The Foreword

can be as loaded as we like in terms of the political message (provided it is

consistent with the dossier itself), whereas the text itself should be the judgement

of the experts.”256

512. The minute was copied to Mr Campbell, Mr Powell and Sir David Manning.

513. Mr Campbell produced a draft Foreword for Mr Blair on 16 September.257

The draft began:

“The document published today is the work of the Joint Intelligence Committee …”

514. Referring to the intelligence which had “formed the judgements” in the dossier,

the draft stated:

“I and other Ministers have been briefed in detail on the sources, and are satisfied

as to their authority, and the authority of the information they have disclosed.

“What I believe they established beyond doubt is that Saddam has continued to

produce chemical and biological weapons that he continues in his efforts to develop

nuclear weapons, and to extend the range of his ballistic missile programme.

“This picture … has become more not less worrying. Faced with the picture put

before me on seeing a succession of JIC papers on the subject, as Prime Minister

I have a choice: do I ignore this evidence or do I act to address the threat?

254 Email Owen to Sedwill, 11 September 2002, ‘Dossier 10/9 Version – Comments’.

255 Email Sedwill to Gray, 11 September 2002, ‘Iraq Dossier: 10/9 Version – Foreign Secretary’s

Comments’.

256 Minute Bowen to Scarlett, 11 September 2002, ‘The Iraq Dossier’.

257 Email Hatfield to Blackshaw, 16 September 2002, ‘Draft’ attaching Document, [undated], ‘Dossier

Foreword by TB’.

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