The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
48.
The Embassy
recorded that two points required consideration in relation to
changes
in UK troop
levels in MND(SE); the provision of protection for all UK activity
in the region
and how to
maintain the security of the oil infrastructure.
49.
Mr Blair
wrote to President Bush on 27 June, to share concerns raised with
him by
his human
rights envoy, Ms Ann Clwyd, during her recent visit to
Iraq.19
50.
Ms Clwyd had
observed that it would be important not to burden the Iraqi
authorities
with a very
large volume of security detainees when responsibility for security
was
transferred
and had therefore recommended that the UK and US seek to reduce
the
number
held, possibly by way of an amnesty. Mr Blair wrote that: “A
carefully managed
process of
releases could help our Sunni outreach efforts.”
51.
Ms Clwyd had
also raised concerns about the Iraqi Special Tribunal (IST),
which
had been
set up to try members of the previous regime. Mr Blair
commented that a
credible
IST process which delivered “justice for the appalling crimes of
the previous
regime”
would have a major political impact but that the coalition may need
to ensure
that the
IST did not “rush to try the most serious cases before they are
ready”.
52.
Mr Blair
noted that both these issues would require careful handling and his
and
President
Bush’s personal attention, not least because of their impact on
Iraqi – and
especially
Sunni – opinion. Sir Nigel Sheinwald would follow up on the detail
with
Mr Hadley.
53.
On 28 June,
President Bush spoke to the US public from Fort Bragg,
North
Carolina.20
He
described Iraq as the “latest battlefield” in the Global War
Against Terror
and told
listeners that:
“Our
mission in Iraq is clear. We’re hunting down the terrorists. We’re
helping Iraqis
build a
free nation that is an ally in the war on terror. We’re advancing
freedom in the
broader
Middle East. We are removing a source of violence and instability
…”
54.
President Bush
emphasised the importance that the coalition was placing
on
training
the ISF and the new steps that US forces were taking to make this
process more
effective.
On the question of when US troops would be withdrawn, he
said:
“I
recognize that Americans want our troops to come home as quickly as
possible.
So do I.
Some contend that we should set a deadline for withdrawing US
forces. Let
me explain
why that would be a serious mistake. Setting an artificial
timetable would
send the
wrong message to the Iraqis, who need to know that America will not
leave
before the
job is done. It would send the wrong message to our troops, who
need to
know that
we are serious about completing the mission they are risking their
lives to
achieve.
And it would send the wrong message to the enemy, who would know
that
19
Letter
Sheinwald to Hadley, 27 June 2005, ‘Iraq’ attaching
Note Blair to Bush, [undated], ‘Note from the
Prime
Minister to President Bush’.
20
The White
House, 28 June 2005, ‘President addresses nation, discusses Iraq,
war on terror’.
496