6.4 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, mid-2001
to January 2003
on the
consequences for UK force-regeneration: “what is beginning to
emerge in the
development
of our work is the need for a possible post-conflict stabilisation
force in
order to
meet the grand strategic end state of a new acceptable
government”.
294.
The concept of
a stabilisation force does not re-emerge in the papers seen
by
the Inquiry
until the second half of December.
295.
Mr Watkins
sent Mr Rycroft MOD advice on three options for a UK contribution
to
US-led
military operations in Iraq on 26 July.168
Mr Watkins
reported that US “thinking
about
dealing with the aftermath of a successful attack remains
sketchy”.
296.
The three
options identified by the MOD, known as Packages 1, 2 and 3,
made
no explicit
reference to possible post-conflict commitments. They remained the
broad
framework
for discussions until the end of 2002.
297.
Mr Rycroft
commented to Mr Blair:
“The
military are not yet ready to make a recommendation on which if any
of the
three
options to go for. Nor can they yet judge whether the US have a
winning
concept.
They are continuing to work with the US military. You do not need
to take
298.
Mr Straw spoke
to Mr Colin Powell, US Secretary of State, on 26 July.
Reporting
the outcome
to Mr Blair, he explained that the “day after” was a shared
anxiety: military
action
would work, but the US and UK would need “an army of occupation for
many
years
afterwards. That was the only way. The dissidents would not run a
government.”170
299.
As a
contingency for a possible follow-up visit to the US by Mr Straw,
Mr Ricketts
commissioned
briefing from Mr Chaplin on a number of issues, including
“Prospects for
post-war
stability” on 30 July.171
Questions
for Mr Chaplin to consider included:
•
was the US
doing “serious work on how to hold Iraq together”?
•
was the US
military prepared to stay on in the numbers needed?
•
where would
an Iraqi Karzai172
emerge
from?
•
would the
UN lead reconstruction and nation-building?
300.
Mr Chaplin
provided answers to some of those questions in early
September.
301.
In his address
to a CENTCOM conference on 2 August, described in more
detail
in Section
6.1, Major General David Wilson, Senior British Military Adviser
(SBMA) at
CENTCOM,
made a number of observations about the US military plan, including
that:
168
Letter
Watkins to Rycroft, 26 July 2002, ‘Iraq’.
169
Minute
Rycroft to Prime Minister, 31 July 2002, ‘Iraq: Background
Papers’.
170
Letter
Straw to Blair, 26 July 2002, ‘Iraq’.
171
Minute
Ricketts to Chaplin, 30 July 2002, ‘Iraq’.
172
Mr Hamid
Karzai, Chairman of the Afghan Interim Administration,
2001-2002.
163