3.5 |
Development of UK strategy and options, September to November 2002
–
the
negotiation of resolution 1441
435.
In conclusion,
Mr Grainger wrote:
“What we
say to the French as a tactical ploy is one thing, but we should be
under
no illusion
that the use of force solely on the basis of the first resolution
as currently
drafted
would be unlawful.”
436.
Reporting
major difficulties with the negotiations, Sir Jeremy
Greenstock
proposed a
way of bridging the gap between the US, UK and French
positions
by making
the UK’s expectation of a second resolution authorising force
implicit
rather than
explicit.
437.
In a telegram
to Mr Straw late on 11 October, Sir Jeremy Greenstock advised
that
Mr Straw’s
visit to Washington was “an opportunity to get a firm message
across to the
Americans
about UK requirements”, and offered “some thoughts about turning
our need
for UN
legal cover into virtue”.154
438.
Sir Jeremy
advised: “The French/US standoff is looking unresolvable. It places
the
UK in a
very difficult situation.”
439.
Sir Jeremy
calculated that the US “could not get nine positive votes for a
first‑stage
resolution
that appeared to authorise US military force”. Norway and Bulgaria
would
be the only
two countries which could be counted on to vote with the US and UK;
but
“only
if some of the excesses” in the draft provisions on the
inspections regime were
“trimmed”.
There could be seven abstentions.
440.
Sir Jeremy
predicted:
“Even if
they [the US] managed to find a text which attracted nine votes, it
would
leave the
inspection regime in a weak position and Iraq somewhat
comforted.
More to
the legal point, many members of the Council … could be expected to
make
explanations
of vote stating that they regarded it as essential for the Council
to meet
to take a
decision on any report of significant Iraqi
non‑co‑operation.”
441.
Sir Jeremy
reported that he was concerned that Secretary Powell thought he
had
nine votes
for a first stage resolution that would satisfy the US. His
judgement was that
Mr de
Villepin’s calculation was more accurate. Mr Annan
agreed.
442.
Addressing the
question of where that left the UK, Sir Jeremy wrote:
“We have to
ensure that decisions taken by … [the UK Government] conform
with
international
law, as you [Mr Straw] and the Prime Minister have made clear
publicly.
A first
resolution which falls short of explicit or implicit authorisation
of the use of
force
would, I assume be insufficient as a basis for UK military action,
depending of
course on
the circumstances and the final advice of the Law Officers. I have
seen no
154
Telegram
1955 from UKMIS New York to FCO London, 11 October 2002, ‘Iraq:
Security Council
Resolution’.
279