The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
made to
stay … and provide a medium-term stabilisation/peace keeping
force”. The
upper
limit, based on what was feasible in military terms, was a two-year
commitment
at a
total cost of £1.6bn. The advice continued:
“The extent
to which any of this is optional is unclear. We think that,
because
of our
Geneva convention obligations, it will be impossible to resist
keeping a
substantial
force in theatre for at least six months post the end of fighting …
In
practice
the emerging politics of a post-conflict Iraq point to a much more
substantial
commitment
both in terms of size and length of stay.”
512.
The official
raised the need to take into account the cost of humanitarian
and
reconstruction
assistance. He did not expect that the Treasury’s insistence
that
departments
(mainly DFID) should meet those costs through budget
reprioritisation
would hold.
As a “worst case”, he anticipated £250m for humanitarian costs and
£250m
for
reconstruction costs in the UK financial year 2003/04 (with figures
for future years to
be
determined later).
513.
On 24
February, Mr Jeremy Heywood, Principal Private Secretary to
Mr Blair, sent
Mr Mark
Bowman, Mr Brown’s Principal Private Secretary, a paper on
financing Iraqi
reconstruction
prepared by the No.10 Policy Directorate. Mr Blair wanted to
share the
paper with
the US as soon as possible.218
The paper
was also sent to the FCO, DFID,
DTI and the
Cabinet Office.
514.
The No.10
paper stated that the cost of “reconstruction and nation-building”
in Iraq
would be
between US$30bn and US$105bn, excluding the direct cost of conflict
and
post-conflict
peacekeeping. Only an administration enjoying the legitimacy
provided by
the UN
would be free to engage with the financial markets to secure
funding for Iraq’s
long-term
future.
515.
Mr Bowman
replied on 25 February, explaining that the Treasury “fully
supports the
main
message of the paper, that, in the absence of a UN mandate, the
financing costs of
reconstructing
Iraq will be significantly higher”.219
Mr Bowman
offered detailed comments
on the text
and pointed out that the Treasury was already involved in
complementary
work
alongside the IPU and in liaison with the US and
Australia.
516.
Mr Straw’s
Private Office reinforced the message that work was already
under
way
elsewhere, adding that “interdepartmental discussion is needed to
get the complex
issues
touched on right”.220
It added
that, while it was welcome that No.10 wanted to
share UK
concerns and explore options with the US at a high level, the paper
needed
improvement.
If shared with the US in its current form it would undermine
efforts to build
up a
constructive bilateral dialogue on post-conflict economic
issues.
218
Letter
Heywood to Bowman, 24 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Reconstruction’
attaching Paper [unattributed and
undated],
‘Financing the Reconstruction of Iraq’.
219
Letter
Bowman to Heywood, 25 February 2003, [untitled].
220
Letter Owen
to Heywood, 25 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Reconstruction’.
400