14.1 |
Military equipment (post-conflict)
260.
DEC(SP) also
wrote that the actual requirement for Type B vehicles was 396
but
the savings
measure agreed in February 2004 had rendered that
unrealistic.
261.
The minute
concluded, however, by stating that the enhancement measure
agreed
in the same
review, to bring forward the funding for 80 vehicles to 2004/05,
had enabled
the search
for a solution:
“To date
light protected mobility in an expeditionary role has been
something of an
orphan
capability, managed on an ad hoc basis from a base capability
centred on
the NI
role. Operational imperatives and the bring‑forward of funding now
offer the
opportunity
to develop the capability in support of global expeditionary
operations,
delivering
a coherent and integrated concept, whilst at the same time
continuing to
meet
long‑term NI commitments.”
262.
An acquisition
strategy for the Type B (expeditionary) PPV capability was
produced
by the
Specialist Utility Vehicle IPT on 19 July.130
It stated
that operational analysis
studies had
“discounted the use of Snatch 2 as a coherent option for meeting
this
capability”.
It considered three options:
•
to do
nothing;
•
a
commercial off‑the‑shelf or a modified commercial off‑the‑shelf
procurement;
or
•
design
development – creating a “bespoke” solution.
263.
The option to
do nothing was not recommended because the “use of
in‑service
assets that
fail to meet the minimum stated performance levels would put users
at risk
and
potentially create an operational vacuum at the source of
provision”. The time and
cost
implications of the design development option meant that that was
also ruled out.
264.
Considering
the commercial off‑the‑shelf procurement, the IPT wrote that
there
were “a
number of products on the market from specialist military vehicle
suppliers
that could
provide a near match to the identified KURs and derived KSRs [Key
Service
Requirements]”.
The difficulty was that there would “inevitably” be areas that
would not
be
“optimised for British Army use”, such as communications
equipment.
265.
A modified
commercial off‑the‑shelf procurement was therefore the
recommended
option as
that would allow the MOD to engage suppliers over the British
Army’s specific
requirements.
266.
The
procurement strategy was to be developed and reviewed leading up to
the
submission
of a business case. No timescale or deadline was
specified.
267.
Major General
Peter Gilchrist, Master General of the Ordnance, produced a
paper
for an ECAB
meeting on 20 July on the Army’s Equipment
Programme.131
He said
that
130
Paper SUV
IPT, 19 July 2004, ‘Acquisition Strategy Project DUCKBOARD –
Protected Patrol Vehicle’.
131
Report MGO,
9 July 2004, ‘MGO’s Report to ECAB 2004’.
47