7 |
Conclusions: Pre-conflict strategy and planning
413.
In addition to
providing a mechanism to probe and challenge the
implications
of
proposals before decisions were taken, a Cabinet Committee or a
more structured
process
might have identified some of the wider implications and risks
associated with
the
deployment of military forces to Iraq. It might also have offered
the opportunity to
remedy some
of the deficiencies in planning which are identified in Section 6
of the
Report.
There will, of course, be other policy issues which would benefit
from the
same approach.
414.
Cabinet has a
different role to that of a Cabinet Committee.
415.
Mr Powell
has written that:
“… Cabinet
is the right place to ratify decisions, the right place for people
to raise
concerns if
they have not done so before, the right place for briefings by the
Prime
Minister
and other Ministers on strategic issues, the right place to ensure
political
unity; but
it is categorically not the right place for an informed decision on
difficult
and
detailed policy issues.”190
416.
In 2009, in a
statement explaining a Cabinet decision to veto the release
of
minutes of
one of its meetings under the Freedom of Information Act 2000,
Mr Straw
explained
the need for frank discussion at Cabinet very
cogently:
“Serious
and controversial decisions must be taken with free, frank – even
blunt
deliberations
between colleagues. Dialogue must be fearless. Ministers must
have
the
confidence to challenge each other in private. They must ensure
that decisions
have been
properly thought through, sounding out all possibilities before
committing
themselves
to a course of action. They must not feel inhibited from
advancing
options
that may be unpopular or controversial. They must not be deflected
from
expressing
dissent by the fear that they may be held personally to account for
views
that are
later cast aside.”191
417.
Mr Blair
told the Inquiry that:
“… the
discussion that we had in Cabinet was substantive discussion. We
had it
again and
again and again, and the options were very simple. The options
were:
a sanctions
framework that was effective; alternatively, the UN inspectors
doing
the job;
alternatively, you have to remove Saddam. Those were the
options.”192
190
Powell
J. The New
Machiavelli: How to wield power in the modern world. The
Bodley Head, 2010.
191
Statement J
Straw, 23 February 2009, ‘Exercise of the Executive Override
under section 53 of the
Freedom of
Information Act 2000 in respect of the decision of the Information
Commissioner dated
18 February
2008 (Ref: FS50165372) as upheld by the decision of the Information
Tribunal of 27 January
2009 (Ref:
EA/2008/0024 and EA/2008/0029): Statement of Reasons’.
192
Public
hearing, 29 January 2010, page 22.
627