10.1 | Reconstruction: March 2003 to June 2004

And by helping Iraqis draft a modern, liberal constitution, the CPA gave the Iraqi

people the political structure to define a path to representative government …”647

1104. Mr Blair told the Inquiry that, although anxiety and concern were occasionally

flagged up very strongly in Sir Hilary’s reports from Basra, when Sir Hilary left Iraq at the

end of January 2004, he was, on balance, optimistic rather than pessimistic.648

1105. In response, Sir Hilary wrote to the Inquiry to clarify that his judgement that “the

balance of probability is positive” had referred only to southern Iraq, the region for which

he had some responsibility, not to the country as a whole, about which he was in no

position to make such an assessment.649

1106. Sir Hilary also emphasised that his judgement should be viewed in the context of

the recommendation he put forward at the time, including at his meeting with Mr Blair

in February 2004, that maintaining momentum in CPA(South) could best be achieved

by retaining a multinational development presence in the South, able to draw on the

expertise, contacts and trust built up during the CPA period. However:

“In the event, my strategy was not accepted. The international team, who included

a large number of British specialists, was disbanded. While DFID managed a small

number of British-owned projects, the vast majority of the projects which were being

pursued by the CPA failed, as I had feared.

“I would not suggest that the alternative approach such as I had proposed would

have prevented the subsequent build-up of violence. But it is possible that the

attitudes of the people of the South would have been more positive if they had

experienced the benefits of the projects as they came on stream … Had I known that

the civilian capital, experience and impetus built up over the previous year would be

allowed to fall away … I would no doubt have offered a different judgement.”

1107. At least US$19.4bn was spent on the relief and reconstruction of Iraq during the

Occupation. Of that, US$16.4bn – almost 85 percent – was Iraqi funding.

1108. The US General Accounting Office (GAO) estimated in June 2004 that as

at the end of April 2004, approximately US$58.3bn had been pledged “to the relief

and reconstruction of Iraq”, of which at least US$23.7bn had been obligated (subject

to a binding agreement that would result in immediate or future outlay of funds)

647 Statement, 18 May 2010, page 5.

648 Public hearing, 21 January 2011, page 135.

649 Letter Synnott to Aldred, 24 January 2011, [untitled].

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