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3.5  |  Development of UK strategy and options, September to November 2002 –
the negotiation of resolution 1441
192.  Mr Blair responded that:
There was a need for the new UN Security Council resolution to be “absolutely
clear and unambiguous about what is expected from Saddam and about what
will follow if he does not comply”.
The UK would “always act in accordance with international law”.
193.  Mr Charles Kennedy, Leader of the Liberal Democrats, stated that legitimate
questions had not been “adequately answered” either by Mr Blair’s statement or the
dossier, including the role of the House of Commons and “the overriding supremacy
of the United Nations”. In his view, the “notion of regime change” was “ill‑defined” and
would “set a dangerous precedent”. The UK also had to be “clear about the possible
consequences”, including the “longer‑term need for a rehabilitation strategy”.
194.  Mr Kennedy asked:
“Does the Prime Minister truly believe that, on the evidence published today,
a sufficient case has now been made that both clarifies Iraq’s present capacity,
as well as its intent?”
195.  Mr Blair responded:
“… yes I do believe the information we published today shows that there is a
continuing chemical and biological weapons programme, and an attempt by Saddam
Hussein to acquire a nuclear weapons capability. That is what I believe, and that
is the assessment of the Joint Intelligence Committee – and frankly I prefer its
assessment to the assessment of the Iraqi regime, which, let us say, on the basis
of experience, is not one that should carry a lot of credibility.”
196.  Mr William Hague (Conservative) asked:
“Does the Prime Minister recollect that, in the half‑century history of various states
acquiring nuclear capabilities, in almost every case – from the Soviet Union in 1949
to Pakistan in 1998 – their ability to do so had been greatly underestimated and
understated by intelligence sources at the time? Estimates today of Iraq taking
several years to acquire a nuclear device should be seen in that context … [I]s there
not at least a significant risk of the utter catastrophe of Iraq possessing a nuclear
device without warning, some time in the next couple of years? In that case, does
not the risk of leaving the regime on its course today far outweigh the risk of taking
action quite soon?”
197.  Mr Blair responded:
“I entirely agree … For the preparation of the dossier we had a real concern not to
exaggerate the intelligence that we had received. For obvious reasons, it is difficult
to reflect the credibility of the information, and we rate the credibility of what we have
very highly. I say no more than that.
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