3.5 |
Development of UK strategy and options, September to November 2002
–
the
negotiation of resolution 1441
192.
Mr Blair
responded that:
•
There was a
need for the new UN Security Council resolution to be
“absolutely
clear and
unambiguous about what is expected from Saddam and about
what
will follow
if he does not comply”.
•
The UK
would “always act in accordance with international
law”.
193.
Mr Charles
Kennedy, Leader of the Liberal Democrats, stated that
legitimate
questions
had not been “adequately answered” either by Mr Blair’s
statement or the
dossier,
including the role of the House of Commons and “the overriding
supremacy
of the
United Nations”. In his view, the “notion of regime change” was
“ill‑defined” and
would “set
a dangerous precedent”. The UK also had to be “clear about the
possible
consequences”,
including the “longer‑term need for a rehabilitation
strategy”.
“Does the
Prime Minister truly believe that, on the evidence published
today,
a sufficient
case has now been made that both clarifies Iraq’s present
capacity,
as well
as its intent?”
“… yes I do
believe the information we published today shows that there is
a
continuing
chemical and biological weapons programme, and an attempt by
Saddam
Hussein to
acquire a nuclear weapons capability. That is what I believe, and
that
is the
assessment of the Joint Intelligence Committee – and frankly I
prefer its
assessment
to the assessment of the Iraqi regime, which, let us say, on the
basis
of experience,
is not one that should carry a lot of credibility.”
196.
Mr William
Hague (Conservative) asked:
“Does the
Prime Minister recollect that, in the half‑century history of
various states
acquiring
nuclear capabilities, in almost every case – from the Soviet Union
in 1949
to Pakistan
in 1998 – their ability to do so had been greatly underestimated
and
understated
by intelligence sources at the time? Estimates today of Iraq
taking
several
years to acquire a nuclear device should be seen in that context …
[I]s there
not at
least a significant risk of the utter catastrophe of Iraq
possessing a nuclear
device
without warning, some time in the next couple of years? In that
case, does
not the
risk of leaving the regime on its course today far outweigh the
risk of taking
action
quite soon?”
“I entirely
agree … For the preparation of the dossier we had a real concern
not to
exaggerate
the intelligence that we had received. For obvious reasons, it is
difficult
to reflect
the credibility of the information, and we rate the credibility of
what we have
very
highly. I say no more than that.
233