The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
857.
The aim of the
second report from the DIS Red Team (‘Obtaining and
Retaining
the Support
of the Iraqi People in the Aftermath of Conflict’), issued on 7
March, was:
“To identify
the optimum structure of the Immediate and Interim Administrations
in Iraq
and other
measures most likely to obtain and retain the support of the Iraqi
people.”359
858.
The Red Team
listed six key judgements and three key
considerations:
“Key
judgements:
•
Internal
Iraqi support is likely to be the single most important factor to
the
success of
the whole operation. After a ‘honeymoon period’, Iraqi support
is
likely to
become fragile and will depend on the way the early phases of
the
military
campaign were conducted and the effectiveness of the
immediate
post-conflict
administration.
•
The
Immediate Administration will be established as a ‘belligerent
occupation’,
which will
require Coalition forces to provide a wide range of
administrative
support, as
well as maintaining law and order.
•
The form of
the Interim Administration is not yet clear, but in descending
order
of acceptability
is likely to be:
{{UN
Assistance Mission with strong US/UK civilian and military
contributions.
{{US-led
civilian administration.
{{‘Full
blown’ UN administration – on the lines of UNMIK [UN Mission
in
Kosovo] or
UNTAET [UN Transitional Administration in East Timor].
•
The
critical success factor from the outset will be the engagement of
local
representatives
in advisory bodies at national, regional and local level.
Iraqi
representation
must not be restricted to Iraqi exile bodies.
•
Opportunities
must be taken to hand over administrative responsibility to
local
authorities
as they become competent and are approved by advisory
bodies.
•
Law and
order, including the judicial process, will require special
handling and
the
retention of executive authority by the Interim
Administration.
…
“Key
Considerations.
•
Fragility
of Popular Support … There is
likely to be widespread support for
Coalition
forces in the immediate aftermath, but it will be extremely
fragile.
Retaining
support will depend on:
{{The
conduct of the early phases of the campaign …
{{Providing
food, water, medical assistance and shelter …
{{Prompt
action to mark and clear unexploded ordnance …
359
Minute
PS/CDI to APS2 SofS [MOD], 7 March 2003, ‘Iraq Red Team – Obtaining
and Retaining the
Support of
the Iraqi People in the Aftermath of Conflict’ attaching Paper DIS
Red Team, 7 March 2003,
‘Obtaining
and retaining the support of the Iraqi people in the aftermath of
conflict’.
466