The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
384.
Mr Blair
continued to reserve his position about whether a new
Security
Council
resolution would be required to authorise military
action.
385.
During Prime
Minister’s Questions (PMQs) on 24 July, Mr Blair was asked
by
Mr Peter
Kilfoyle (Labour) whether, in the event of the US commencing
military action
during the
Recess, Mr Blair would recall Parliament before any British forces
were
committed.
Mr Blair replied that “we have not yet got to the stage of military
action”;
if that
stage was reached “at any point”, Parliament would be “properly
consulted”.155
386.
In his press
conference on 25 July, Mr Blair repeated the line that he had
taken
at the
Liaison Committee on 16 July that Iraq’s position on WMD was an
issue.156
He emphasised
that no decision had been taken about how to deal with it and the
need
to avoid
“getting ahead of ourselves”. He was not prepared to speculate
about an area
of such
“tremendous sensitivity”.
387.
Asked why he
had refused to pledge a vote in the House of Commons before
any
military
activity, Mr Blair said that the House of Commons would be
consulted but it was
important
to follow the precedents and there was no point in speculating at
that point
about the
right way to consult the House. He was not going to pin himself
down to any
specific
form of consultation.
388.
Asked why the
promised dossier laying out the evidence against Saddam
Hussein
had not
appeared, Mr Blair stated that it would be published when he judged
it to be the
right
moment.
389.
Asked whether
the UK would actively be encouraging the US Administration
to
seek a new
UN Security Council resolution as a pre-requisite for military
action, Mr Blair
replied:
“What is
important is that whatever action we take, should we take action,
it is done
in
accordance with international law. I don’t think we can judge the
issue of UN
resolutions
at this present moment … the most important thing is to go back to
…
the UN
resolutions that we have … I haven’t fully caught up on the exact
state of the
negotiations
between the UN Secretary-General and the Iraqis, but the omens
don’t
look very
good frankly for Iraq.
“… the
issue is, is there any point in reviving those negotiations …
because it seems
somewhat
unlikely that the Iraqis intend to comply.”
390.
In response
to the request following the discussion on 23 July
discreetly
to work up
the ultimatum to Saddam Hussein, No.10 was advised on 26 July
that
there would
be “formidable obstacles to overcome” to secure agreement to a
new
155
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 24 July
2002, column 975.
156
The
National Archives, Prime
Minister’s Press Conference, 25 July 2002.
68