1.2 |
Development of UK strategy and options, September 2000 to September
2001
203.
Sir John
Sawers told the Inquiry that No.10 had, perhaps, not been as
involved as
it might
have been in discussion of the 16 February attack:
“This was
briefed to the Prime Minister but both we and the White House were
a bit
surprised …
because we weren’t fully involved in the discussions of the timing
and it
happened at
short notice on a Friday night … a week or so before the Prime
Minister
went off to
Camp David.
“The timing
was coincidental … It did in many ways serve to underline the
difficulty
of
maintaining the policy on No-Fly Zones.”114
204.
Sir John
Sawers agreed with the Inquiry that there had been uproar in the
Middle
East about
the intensity and location of the attacks. He
continued:
“And I
think that was very much on Vice President Cheney and President
Bush’s
minds, that
there had been a sharp reaction. And in a sense it gave force to
the
argument
that we needed to move to a better targeted policy.”
205.
Lord Williams
of Baglan, a Special Adviser to Mr Cook from 2000 to 2001
(and
subsequently
to Mr Straw until July 2005), told the Inquiry that Mr Cook had
been
“concerned
that the attack had not merited Ministerial authorisation”; and
that he feared
“it was the
harbinger of a more assertive US stance on Iraq”.115
206.
At his first
White House press conference in February 2001, President Bush
said
that he
would “review options as to how to make the sanctions
work”.116
207.
On 23
February, before travelling to Camp David, Mr Blair met Vice
President
Cheney in
Washington.117
Mr Blair
argued that the sanctions regime was not perfect, but
that it had
restrained Saddam Hussein.
208.
Mr Blair told
the Inquiry that Iraq was not a top priority for his meeting
with
President
Bush at Camp David.118
209.
Sir
Christopher Meyer told the Inquiry that the two foreign policy
issues at the top
of the
agenda were the anti-ballistic missile treaty and nuclear missile
defence.119
210.
Sir John
Sawers told the Inquiry that Iraq had been the first subject
discussed at
Camp
David:
“… not
because it was the most important but because Colin Powell … was
about
to depart
for the region and … he [President Bush] wanted to deal with Iraq
first so
114
Public
hearing, 15 December 2009, page 48.
115
Statement,
9 January 2011, page 3.
116
The White
House Archive, 22 February 2001, Press Conference by the
President.
117
Letter
Sawers to Cowper-Coles, 24 February 2001, ‘Prime Minister’s Meeting
with Vice President
Cheney,
Washington, 23 February 2001’.
118
Public
hearing, 29 January 2010, page 8.
119
Public
hearing, 26 November 2009, pages 11-12.
231