3.5 |
Development of UK strategy and options, September to November 2002
–
the
negotiation of resolution 1441
and that
they clearly were having the sort of debate and discussion that you
have
164.
Asked if,
given his estimation that Saddam Hussein was unlikely to back
down,
Cabinet
understood that beyond the UN route lay the possibility of military
action,
Mr Blair
said he had been saying that at every Prime Minister’s Questions,
and the
Cabinet was
fully behind the UN route.53
He added
that there were two groups in
Cabinet:
“One group
would have been absolutely with me all the way. The other group
were
saying:
‘Well … we understand it’s a big problem, but let us try to avoid
military
action if
we possibly can and the United Nations route is a good way of doing
that.’
“All of us
knew that at some point there was going to be a moment of truth …
where
you had to
decide are you seeing it through or are you not …”
165.
In response to
a series of questions about when he sought Cabinet
endorsement
for the
policy and whether Cabinet was aware that preparations for military
action were
under way
and that it was taking collective responsibility for the policy,
Mr Blair told the
Inquiry:
“… the
policy was totally clear. The policy was that we were going to deal
with this
issue. Our
preference is to deal with it through the United Nations but not
dealing
with it is
not an option.”54
•
“Of course
they were taking collective responsibility for the policy because
it was
being
outlined the entire time. They know you can’t simply decide one day
…”
•
“I would
have been astonished if they didn’t [know that military
preparations
were under
way] because there was discussion of that.”
•
“I don’t
think anybody was in any doubt about the course they were
on.”
•
“… that
does not mean to say that there were not some who were saying ‘I
wish
we weren’t
on this course’, but it really does defy common sense and logic,
let
alone the
discussion, to think that there were people in the Cabinet who
didn’t
know … that
we were on a course where the principles of it were
absolutely
clear. Go
down the UN route, get an ultimatum. If he fails to meet the
ultimatum
we are
going to be with America on military action … my public comments at
the
time. I set
it out with crystal clarity at the time. That was our position. It
was a
position …
I was under a certain amount of criticism for having, but the
Cabinet
were
completely aware of the fact that’s what we were
on.”55
52
Public
hearing, 14 July 2010, pages 4‑5.
53
Public
hearing, 21 January 2011, pages 19‑20.
54
Public
hearing, 21 January 2011, page 22.
55
Public
hearing, 21 January 2011, pages 23‑25.
227