6.2 |
Military planning for the invasion, January to March
2003
“… made it
very clear that he wanted to focus all of his Government’s efforts
on
securing
that second resolution.”
“… quite
confident at that stage that he [Mr Blair] would not have welcomed
any
efforts to
discuss the military options in relation to Iraq. In the absence of
Prime
Ministerial
agreement to such a discussion, it would not have taken
place.”
“Nevertheless
because I thought colleagues should be aware at this juncture
about
the
military preparations under way, and because this had not been
discussed at the
Cabinet
meeting on 16 January on the second resolution, I arranged for a
paper on
this
subject to be circulated.”
191.
The absence of
any collective discussion of the military options, despite Mr
Blair’s
promises,
is addressed later in this Section.
192.
Mr Blair’s
decision not to reveal that he had been advised that a
further
determination
by the Security Council that Iraq was in material breach of its
obligations
would be
required to authorise the revival of the authority to take military
action,
or to
invite Lord Goldsmith, the Attorney General, to speak at Cabinet on
16 March,
is
addressed in Section 5.
193.
Mr Hoon wrote
to Mr Blair on 16 January seeking agreement to the “key role
in
southern
Iraq” proposed by the US for the UK:
“Important
questions remain to be resolved … But the role proposed for the UK
is
a sensible
and significant one, and I recommend that with certain
qualifications,
we accept
it. We need to decide quickly.”67
194.
Mr Hoon added
that equipment and personnel would need to be moved early
the
following
week and that, if Mr Blair agreed, he proposed:
“… to
announce the composition and deployment of the force in an oral
statement
on Monday
20 January.”
195.
Mr Hoon set
out the proposed UK contribution as discussed in the briefing
the
previous
day, including that the provision of US logistic support would
enable the UK to
“make
compensating reductions in our force, which would number around
26,000 rather
than the
28,000 originally envisaged” for the deployment of a single
armoured brigade
67
Letter Hoon
to Blair, 16 January 2003, ‘Iraq: UK Land
Contribution’.
413