The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
in 2009.
Ambassador Crocker said that the US would value some continued UK
support
in a US-led
PRT.
1007.
Mr Alexander
and Ambassador Crocker also agreed that the World Bank
should
be lobbied
“at the highest levels” to increase its presence in
Iraq.
1008.
The Embassy
also reported that Mr Alexander had set out DFID’s plans
to
withdraw
from Basra in mid-2009 and move to a “whole of Iraq” approach,
delivered
through
support to central Government, in line with Prime Minister Maliki’s
wishes.
1009.
In Basra,
Mr Alexander attended the launch of the Basra Investment
Commission –
formerly
known as the Basra Investment Promotion Agency (BIPA).
1010.
The 7 November
meeting of the ISOG discussed a draft post-drawdown
strategy
(in advance
of an NSID(OD) discussion the following month).592
The meeting
asked for
departments
to take action on a number of issues, including:
“DFID to
consider whether a presence only in Baghdad supported by
a
communications
strategy and programme funding in the south, would be sufficient
to
sustain our
legacy there, protect our reputation and ensure the US did not win
credit
for
progress that we had engineered.”
1011.
Mr Alexander
wrote to Mr Brown on 20 November to provide an update
on
progress in
Basra and to set out how he saw DFID’s role changing in the context
of the
UK’s
“change of mission”.593
1012.
He reported
that DFID had already facilitated 18 investor visits by 14
companies,
with
proposals worth over US$9bn submitted to, but not yet processed by,
the Iraqi
Government.
The Iraqi Government’s inability to process those proposals was the
main
obstacle to
international investment in Basra.
1013.
DFID’s
infrastructure projects would be completed by the end of 2008, and
its
work with
the Basra provincial administration would come to a “natural
conclusion”
by
mid-2009. The key to achieving a positive legacy for the UK was
securing
inward
investment. Given that the key obstacles to such investment were in
central
Government,
DFID would focus its effort there. That was in line with Prime
Minister
Maliki’s
wish for the UK to support the whole of Iraq, not just
Basra.
1014.
Mr Wareing
visited Basra in late November, to launch the Basra
Economic
592
Minute
Cabinet Office [junior official] to Aldred, 10 November 2008, ‘Iraq
Senior Officials Group,
7 November’.
593
Letter
Alexander to Brown, 20 November 2008, [untitled].
594
Minute
Cabinet Office [junior official] to Prime Minister, 28 November
2008, ‘[redacted] Iraq: Update’.
360